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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to determine whether 
options listing induces additional information acquisition 
and processing and hence causes a commensurate reduction in 
the information content of annual earnings announcement.
The U-statistic is used to measure the information content 
of annual earnings announcements. The dissertation tests 
the options listing effects on four different designs: i)
all exchange (NYSE/AMEX) firms, ii) large exchange firms 
versus small exchange firms, iii) positive unexpected 
earnings firms versus negative unexpected earnings firms, 
and iv) all over-the-counter firms.
The research found that, after options listing, the U- 
statistic of the exchange firms decreases significantly 
during the annual earnings announcement day. The results 
also show significant increase in U-statistic during the 
pre-announcement period after option listing, indicating 
that the earnings information may have been impounded into 
the securities markets earlier.
In testing the 'size* hypothesis, the results show that 
options listing has a moderately stronger impact on small 
firms than large firms. However, the results do not support 
the hypothesis that options listing has a stronger impact on 
firms with negative unexpected earnings than firms with 
positive unexpected earnings.
ix
Finally, the results show that options listing has a 
moderately significant impact on the information content of 
annual earnings announcements of the OTC firms.
x
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The accounting research literature which examines the 
association between accounting earnings and stock prices 
provides convincing evidence that accounting data convey 
relevant and timely information. For example, Beaver 
[1968], Patell and Wolfson [1981], and McNichols and 
Manegold [1983] show that Lne stock price variance during 
announcement periods is significantly larger than in 
nonannouncement periods. These results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that earnings data convey new information to 
the market.
Options have been a dynamic segment of the securities 
industry since the inception of the Chicago Board of Options 
Exchange (CBOE) in April 1973 .1 Several studies (e.g., 
Officer and Trennepohl [1981] and Whiteside, Dukes, and 
Dunne [1983]) have investigated the effect of options 
trading on the underlying stocks' price behavior. These 
studies have mixed results. Hanaster and Rendleman [1986], 
however, suggest that options trading may improve market 
efficiency. They argue that options trading affects the way 
stock prices adjust to the release of information relevant
'The United States currently has five options 
exchanges. They are the CBOE, New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), Philadelphia Stock 
Exchange (FHL.X) , and Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE) .
1
to firms valuation. The purpose of this study is to 
investigate whether options listing affects the manner in 
which accounting information is disseminated in the 
securities markets. Specifically, the research examines 
whether options listing induces additional information 
acquisition and processing and hence causes a commensurate 
reduction in the information content of annual earnings 
announcements.
1.1. Background
In order to investigate whether accounting data convey 
relevant and timely information, empirical research has 
investigated the association between accounting earnings and 
equity security returns. Studies such as Beaver [1968], 
Patell and Wolfson [1981], and McNichols and Manegold [1983] 
have found that the stock price revisions during the 
earnings announcement period are significantly larger than 
during the nonannouncement period. These results are 
consistent with, and therefore support, the hypothesis that 
earnings data convey new information to investors.
Research studies also investigate various factors that 
affect the information content of earnings announcements. 
Briefly, several studies found significant relationships 
between unexpected earnings and unexpected return during the 
announcement period (e.g., Beaver [1974], Beaver et. al.
[1979], Patell [1976], and Joy et. al [1977]). Other
3studies found that the information content of earnings 
announcement is inversely related to the amount of 
information disclosed in the nonannouncement period (e.g., 
Grant [1980], and McNichols and Manegold [1983]). In 
addition, studies generally found that the earnings 
announcement of small firms has more information content 
than the earnings announcement of large firms (Atiase
[1980], Grant [1980], Freeman [1987]). The results of these 
studies seem to suggest that sma11 firms are less 
informationally efficient than large firms (commonly called 
the size' effect). Down and Dyckman [1973] contend that 
smaller and less well-known firms have fewer analysts 
following their activities. As a result, the accounting 
reports may represent important information sources for 
small firms vis-a-vis large firms.
Information-content studies, especially the 'size' 
effect studies, make important contributions not only to the 
accounting reasearch but also to the market efficiency 
research as well. The following sections briefly discusss 
how options trading may improve informational efficiency and 
consequently affect information content of annual earnings 
announcements.
1.2 Anomalies to Market Efficiency
Information content and market efficiency research are 
closely related because all of the market-based accounting
4research (MBAR) is based on either or both of the following 
assumptions: (1) the capital market is an efficient capital
market (ECM), and/or (2) the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) is valid.
For empirical testing purposes, Fama [1970] 
operationalized the notion of market efficiency into three 
categories, which depend on the nature of the information 
set of interest. The categories are the strong form, semi- 
strong form, and weak form. Fama found considerable 
evidence to support: the semi-strong form of capital market 
efficiency, at least for NYSE-listed firms. That is, the 
market equilibrium prices of securities fully reflect all
publicly available information, such as earnings
announcements, instantaneously and in an unbiased manner.
Despite the acceptance of the semi-strong form of 
market efficiency, the evidence on market efficiency is not
unanimous. in the last decade, "anomalies" in market
efficiency have been found at an increasing rate. First, 
and perhaps the most puzzling, is referred to as the "post 
earnings announcement drift"; stock prices appear to react 
with a lag to earnings announcements (Joy, Litzenberger, and 
McEnally [1977], Watts [1978], Brown [1978], Joy and Jones 
[1979]). This phenomenon is incompatible with the 
instantaneous adjustment property of an informationally 
efficient market.
5Secondly, Basu [1977] shows that risk-adjusted excess 
returns can be earned by purchasing securities whose price- 
to-earnings (P/E) ratios are in the lower one-fifth of firms 
in a given sample. Moreover, some studies have found that 
abnorma1 returns accrue as a result of following experts1 
recommendations appearing in the financial press: Wall
Street Journal column "Heard on the Street" and Briloff's 
critical articles in Barron's (Davies and Canes [1978], and 
Foster [1979]). Presumably, expert opinions issued by the 
financial press are based on publicly disclosed information. 
If the market is efficient, such information should not have 
prompted abnormal profits.
There are many other observed phenomena which cannot be 
explained by the efficient market hypothesis as 
traditionally propagated. Some examples are: (1) stock
prices annually rise in early January ("January effect");
(2) stock prices fall more often than not on Monday; and (3) 
the Dow index dropped 508 points in one day on the well- 
known Black Monday of 1987. These unexplained phenomena 
suggest that the conventional notion of informational 
efficiency needs modification. The emerging notion of 
informational efficiency is a "relative" form of 
informational efficiency.
6l.3 Relative informational Efficiancy
In the midst of this contradictory evidence concerning 
an efficient market, the relative efficiency hypothesis 
appears to satisfactorily explain the situation. The 
relative efficiency hypothesis maintains that there exists a 
differential efficiency for classes of securities. In other 
words, markets may be more efficient for some types of 
f irms.
Grossman and Stiglitz [1976] demonstrate that stock 
prices never fully reflect all of the information possessed 
by the informed individuals in a competitive equilibrium. 
Information is transmitted from the more-informed to the 
less-informed individuals through trading-induced price 
changes, which ultimately arrive at the equilibrium price.
In short, the capital markets are not efficient, as 
investors do not have homogenous information or 
expectations. This suggests that firms with more-informed 
investors are more responsive to information than are firms 
with less-informed investors.
Similarly, Diamond and Verrecchia [1981] contend that 
prices do not transmit all information possessed by informed 
traders, and that there is only a partial convergence of 
beliefs. As long as the cost of acquiring and processing 
the information is, at the margin, less than the benefits, 
the investors will continue to process more information.
Verrecchia [1979] argues that the extent to which 
prices reflect the true distribution of an information set 
may depend substantially upon the number of traders who 
actively participate in the market for that security. For 
empirical testing purposes, he suggests that the number of 
informed market participants can be approximated by firm 
size, trading volume, number of shares outstanding, or 
number of shareholders. To encourage the research effort in 
the area, Verrechia states that "...there is a definite need 
for further research to determine what characteristics of 
the market imply a greater (or lesser) degree of efficiency 
among securit ies. In this way we can hope to adapt 
accounting information standards to a specific market 
requirement" [1979, p.90],
1.4 Effects of Options Listing on Informational Efficiency
Some researchers suggest that the lisitng of options 
may increase informational efficiency. Ross [1976] contends 
that options may improve the allocational efficiency of the 
economy. He maintains that options can make an incomplete 
market more complete. Extending Ross's contention, Kluger 
and Wyatt [1988] argue that informational efficiency might 
also be improved in a world with an incomplete market 
because information which is signalled to the market through 
a single price before options are listed can be signalled 
through two separate prices after options are listed.
8There is some empirical evidence supporting the 
position that options trading may enhance information 
processing and hence the informational efficiency of the 
securities markets. Manaster and Rendleman (MR) [1982] 
suggest that options trading may affect the way stock prices 
adjust to the release of information relevant to firms 
valuation. MR found evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
options prices anticipate the information reflected in stock 
prices by a period of up to 24 hours. This suggests that 
options prices reflect the options market's own assessment 
of stock values rather than the contemporaneously observed 
stock price. Other studies with similar findings include 
Bhattacharva [1987], Snelling [1986], and Anthony [1988].
Jenning and Starks (JS) [1986] investigates the speed 
of stock price adjustment initiated by quarterly earnings 
announcements using two samples of firms: one having 
exchange-1isted options and another without exchange-listed 
options. JS found that the stock prices of firms without 
exchange-listed options take a longer time to adjust to 
earnings announcements than do the stock prices of options 
listed firms.
1.5 Impact of options Listing on the Information
Content of Earnings Announcements
Diamond and Verrechia (DV) [1987] infer that because 
the options market places fewer restrictions on establishing 
a short position in a security, listing would enhance the
9speed of adjustment to private information and particularly 
to bad news. DV suggest that options trading thereby 
reduces the average absolute value of (excess) returns on 
announcement days. In other words, DV' s model implies that, 
ceteris paribus, options listing reduces the information 
content of the earnings announcements of firms.2
1.6 Implications for Accounting
The present study makes several contributions to both 
the information-content studies and market efficiency areas. 
The research provides additional insight into the role of 
the options market in the processing of accounting 
information; specifically, it will test whether options 
listing induces additional information acquisition and 
processing before the annual earnings announcement and hence 
reduces the informativeness of annual earnings 
announcements. These findings will facilitate our 
understanding of the accounting information dissemination 
process in security markets.
Moreover, this study is a response to Verrechia [1979] 
which calls for further research to determine which
leaver's U statistic is measured as the variance of 
price reaction (approximated by square of excess return) 
during the announcement period divided by the variance 
during the nonannouncement period. Therefore, if the 
absolute value of the (excess) return during the 
announcement period is reduced so is Beaver's U statistic.
characteristics of the market imply a greater (or lesser) 
degree of efficiency among securities. The goal is to adapt 
accounting information standards to specific market 
requirements (see p.8). This study investigates whether 
options listing is one of the characteristics which makes 
securities pricing more efficient.
If options listing has an impact on the information 
content of the earnings announcements, then failure to 
control for the options effect may bias the conclusions of 
information-content studies where options listing is an 
important variable.
1.8 Overview
The purpose of this study is to empirically test for 
the options listing effects on the information content of 
annual earnings announcements. The study will examine the 
differential impact of options 1isting on large and small 
firms. Moreover, the study will also test for differential 
impact of options on firms with both positive and negative 
unexpected earnings.
CHAPTER 2 
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this research study is to investigate 
the impact of options listing cn the information-content of 
annual earnings announcements. Therefore, the literature 
review chapter is divided into three sub-sections: (1)
information-content studies, (2) efficient market studies, 
and (3) options studies. A review of the information- 
content studies is provided to illustrate how the 
information content of earnings announcements are measured. 
The efficient market studies, especially the relative market 
efficiency hypothesis, are reviewed in order to establish 
the underlying theory of this study. The purpose of the 
third section is to review the studies on options and to 
establish how options trading may improve information 
processing and therefore affect the information-content of 
earnings announcements.
2.1 INFORMATION CONTENT STUDIES
Numerous studies on the relationship between earnings 
reports and security price behavior seek to demonstrate that 
accounting data convey relevant and timely information. If 
earnings reports convey information which is not already 
anticipated by the security markets, the security price 
should change during the announcement period. Therefore, by 
looking at the security price reaction around the earnings
11
12
announcement date, one can infer whether the earnings 
announcement contains such information.
Since earnings expectations form the basis of security 
value, an unanticipated change in a firm's expected earnings 
should be accompanied by a stock price movement. The 
seminal Ball and Rroup [1969] study indicates that positive 
earnings forecast errors are accompanied by positive 
unsystematic security price returns, and conversely for 
negative earning forecast errors. However, about eighty- 
five percent of the stock-price reaction occurred prior to 
the earnings announcements. The result should not be too 
surprising, considering that there are so many channels 
which firms can use to directly or indirectly release their 
earnings information during the predisclosure period (i.e., 
interim leports, production reports, and Wall Street Journal 
releases etc). Nevertheless, Ball and Brown study appears 
to support the notion that earnings announcements convey 
information to investors.
Beaver [1968] uses the U-statistic to measure the 
informativeness of earnings announcements. The U-statistic 
is calculated by dividing the return variance during the 
announcements period by the return variance during the 
nonannouncement period. Accordingly, if the price activity 
during the announcement period is larger than the 
nonannouncement period, the U-statistic will be greater than
1. The sample used by Beaver had an average U value of
13
1.67, suggesting that security price revisions did occur 
during the announcement period. Beaver's U statistic has 
been used in many other studies (e.g., May [1971], Hagerman 
[1973], Grant [1980], and McNichols and Manegold [1982]).
The mathematical details of the U-statistic will be 
discussed in chapter 3.
Magnitude of Unexpected Earnings
Several studies have expanded on the Ball-Brown study 
to incorporate the magnitude of unexpected earnings in 
addition to size. If stock prices react to unexpected 
earnings, the reaction should be greater for larger 
unexpected earnings and vice versa. Beaver, Clarke, and 
Wright [1979] found that 2 5 NYSE portfolios, ranked on the 
basis of percentage change in unexpected earnings per share, 
were highly correlated with the ranking of portfolios on the 
basis of the size of residual stock returns. The results 
confirmed that the size of unexpected earnings show high 
positive correlation with the size of unexpected returns. 
Studies with similar findings include Beaver [1974], Magee 
[1975], Patell [1976], and Joy, Litzenberger, and McEnally
[1977].
Firms Size/Exchang* Effects
Several studies have found a cross-sectional 
difference in price reactions to earnings announcements.
14
For example, studies in general have found that smaller 
firms usually have greater price reaction during the 
earnings announcement period than do larger firms. Downs 
and Dyckman [1973] contend that smaller and less well-known 
firms have fewer analysts following their activities. As a 
result, the accounting reports may represent important 
information sources for smaller firms vis-a-vis large firms.
Likewise, Atiase [1980] argues that the amount of 
private predisclosure information production and 
dissemination increases with firm size. Large (NYSE) firms 
have more channels, such as the Wall Street Journal, to 
disclose their interim sources of information in comparison 
to small (OTC) firms. Accordingly, the amount of surprise 
(information-content) in the earnings announcement should be 
comparatively smaller for large firms. Since there is no 
direct measure of predisclosure information, studies have 
used proxies such as firm capitalization or exchange listing 
to measure predisclosure information (e.g., Atiase 
[19B0;1985]; Grant [1980]).
Grant [1980] compares the information-content of 
annual earnings announcements for a sample of OTC firms and 
a sample of NYSE firms. The exchange listing is used as a 
proxy for size. Grant found that during the test period, 
the NYSE firms had twice as many interim news items appear 
in the Wall Street Journal as the OTC firms did. This 
evidence is consistent with the claim that large firms have
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more predisclosure information releases than do small firms. 
Grant found that the average U statistic of 1.28 for the 
NYSE firms is significantly lower than the average U 
statistic of 2.60 for the OTC firms. These results support 
the contention that the price reaction of small firms during 
earnings announcement periods is significantly greater than 
for large firms. Atiase [1985] found similar results using 
'firm capitalization* rather than 'exchange listing' as a 
proxy for size.
Atiase [1987] maintains that the two proxies for sizes 
(firm capitalization and exchange listing) may have 
different implications for information dissemination and 
information processing. To investigate the difference in 
the two proxies, Atiase studied both the firm capita1izatiui. 
(i.e., size effect) and the exchange effect together using a 
sample containing both American Stock Exchange (ASE) and OTC 
firms. He found that among the ASE and OTC firms of the 
same size, the earnings announcements of ASE firms are less 
informative than those of OTC firms. Atiase concludes that 
there was a "pure exchange effect" on top of a "size 
effect." He maintains that "being listed on a security 
exchange may give the listed firms greater exposure and is 
likely to create more opportunities for private information 
acquisition which extend beyond the effect of 'size'" [1987, 
p.169 ] .
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Quarterly Reports
The most apparent change in predislosure information is 
the policy implemented by the ASE in 1962 which requires all 
of the ASE firms to provide quarterly earnings reports. 
McNichols and Manegold [1983] investigates whether that 
policy reduces the informativeness of annual earnings 
announcements. They find that the average return variance 
around the annual earnings announcements is significantly 
smaller after the advent of quarterly reporting. This 
result confirms the inverse relationship of predisclosure 
informat ion and price react ion to earnings announcements.
1.3 summary
The "information-content" research has remained active 
for the last two decades. Its contribution to accounting 
theory construction cannot be overstated. In fact, the 
information-content studies have been regarded by some 
researchers (see e.g., Lev and Ohlson [1982, p.262]) as one 
of the most important areas in empirical accounting 
research. Research in this area has provided an ample 
amount of evidence to support the notion that accounting 
reports provide information to investors; earnings 
announcements have information content. Furthermore, 
research also identifies factors which affect the 
information content of earnings announcements: (1) magnitude
of unexpected earnings, (2) firm size, (3) predisclosure
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information, and (4) exchange listing. These factors, if 
uncontrolled, may confound the results of the information- 
content studies.
2.2 MARKET EFFICIENCY
To support the content ion that options 1isting a f fects 
the information content of annual earnings announcements, it 
is necessary to demonstrate that the market is not fully 
informationally efficient. Thus, the market efficiency 
studies, especially the concept of relative informational 
efficiency, are here reviewed in order to establish the 
underlying theory of this study.
Information content and market efficiency research are
closely related because all of the market-based accounting
research (MBAR), including "information content" studies, is
based on either or both of the following assumptions: the
capital market is an efficient capital market (ECM), and the
Capita 1 Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is valid. Lev and Ohlson
[1982] state that:
The ECM assumption justifies the fundamental 
premise that the impact of informational events 
relevant for security valuation (e.g., earnings- 
data disclosure or the enactment of a new 
regulation) could be inferred from changes in 
parameters (e.g., mean, variance) of stock-return 
distributions around identifiable dates of 
disclosure. This then makes capital markets the 
testing ground for information-content hypothesis.
The second assumption— the validity of the CAPM—  
underlies the widely used technique of stock- 
return risk adjustment (or the matching by risk of 
"treatment" and "control" samples) and the derived
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computation of excess (abnormal) rates of return.
(1972, p.283]
Fama [1970] suggests that a market is efficient with 
respect to some set of information if that set of 
information is "fully reflected" in prices. By definition, 
a piece of information is fully reflected in price if it is 
impossible to make economic profits (or excess return) by 
trading on that piece of information. Accordingly, in an 
efficient market, security prices should fully and 
instantaneously reflect all available information.
In the case of earnings information, once they are 
announced, they are known to the participants of the 
security market. If the market is efficient, the stock 
price would instantaneously reflect the information 
contained in the earnings announcements. Therefore, on 
average, the investors can only earn the market risk- 
adjusted return from trading on that piece of information.
Threa Forms of Market Efficiency
For empirical testing purposes, Fama [1970] 
operationalized the notion of market efficiency into three 
categories, which depend on the nature of the information 
set of interest. The categories are:
1. Strong-fonn tests. The tests are concerned with 
whether individual investors or groups have 
monopolistic access to any information (i.e., 
private information) relevant for price formation.
2. Semi-strong-form tests. The information subset in
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these tests includes all obviously publicly 
available information (e.g., announcement of 
annual earnings, stock splits, etc.).
3. Weak-forw tests. The information subset in these 
tests includes only historical prices (e.g., past 
security prices, trading volume, etc.).
In his survey of empirical literature, Fama [1970] 
found cons i derable evidence to «npport the semi-strong form 
of capital market efficiency for NYSE-listed firms. That 
is, the market equilibrium prices of securities fully 
reflected all publicly available information such as 
earnings announcements instantaneously and in an unbiased 
manner.
Anomalies in Efficient Market
Despite the acceptance of the semi-strong form of 
market efficiency, the evidence on market efficiency is not
unanimous. In the last decade, anomalies in market
efficiency have been found in an increasing rate. The 
first, and perhaps the most puzzling one is referred to as
the "post earnings announcement drift"; stock prices appear
to react with a lag to the earnings announcements (Joy, 
Litzenberger, and McEnally [1977], Watts [1978], Brown
[1978], Joy and Jones [1979]). This phenomenon is 
incompatible with the instantaneous adjustment property of 
an informationally efficient market.
Second, studies also show that excess returns can be 
earned by trading with a certain class of stocks. For
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example, Basu [1977] used a strategy of purchasing 
securities whose price-to-earnings (P/E) ratios are in the 
lower one-fifth of all firms in a given sample. He found 
that portfolios comprising low P/E-ratio stocks, after 
adjustment for risk, could earn excess returns.
Moreover, some studies have found that abnormal returns 
can be earned by following experts * recommendations such as: 
Wall Street Journal column "Heard on the Street" or 
Briloff's critical articles in Barron1s (Davies and Canes 
[1978], and Foster [1979]). Presumably, expert opinions 
issued by the financial press are based on publicly 
disclosed information. If the market is efficient, such 
information should not have prompted abnormal profits.
There are many other observed phenomena that cannot be 
explained by the efficient market hypothesis as 
traditionally propagated. Some examples are: (1) stock
prices rise in early January ("January effect"); (2) stock
prices fall more often than not on Monday; (3) the Dow index 
dropped 508 points in one day on Black Monday in 1987.
These unexplained phenomena suggest that the conventional 
notion of informational efficiency needs modification.
Some researchers even question the existence of an 
efficient market in its perfect form. For example,
Sandretto [1979] suggests that it may not be realistic to 
assume an efficient market when the theory underlying the 
efficient market is based on a number of unrealistic
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assumptions, including: (1) perfect markets, (2 ) costless
information, and (3) homogeneous beliefs. For instance, 
information is not costless in the real world. Information, 
in fact, is costly to acquire and to analyze, particularly 
for small firms. Sandretto contends that each of the three 
perfect market requirements are violated to some extent, the 
extent to which they are violated is different cross- 
sectionally, and prices will reflect all available 
information only when all the investors are informed. He 
concludes that this may not be economically feasible with 
the existing institutional arrangements.
Grossman and Stiglitz [1976] contend that stock prices 
never fully reflect all the information possessed by the 
informed individuals in a competitive equilibrium. 
Information is transmitted from the more informed to the 
less informed individuals through trading-induced price 
changes, which ultimately arrive at the equilibrium price.
In short, the capital markets are not efficient, as 
investors do not have homogenous information or 
expectations.
Similarly, Diamond and Verrecchia [1981] contend that 
prices do not transmit all information possessed by informed 
traders, and that there is only a partial convergence in 
beliefs. As long as the cost of acquiring and processing 
the information at the margin is less than the benefits, the 
investors will continue to process more information.
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R»X«tlv Informational Efficiency
In the midst of all the contradictory evidence 
concerning an efficiency market, the relative efficiency 
hypothesis appears to satisfactorily explain the situation. 
The relative efficiency hypothesis maintains that there 
exists a differential efficiency for classes of securities. 
In other words, markets may be more efficient for some types 
of firms. Eandretto [1979J argues that "it may be that for 
large firms, there are a larger number of informed investors 
and a highly efficient market. In contrast, smaller firms 
may have fewer informed investors and their market may be 
less efficient" [1979, pp.26-27].
Verrecchia [1979] argues that the extent to which 
prices reflect the true distribution of an information set 
may depend substantially upon the number of traders who 
actively participate in the market for that security. For 
empirical testing purposes, he suggests that the number of 
informed market participants can be approximated by firm 
size, trading volume, number of share outstanding, or number 
of shareholders. To encourage research in this area, 
Verrecchia states that "... there is a definite need for 
further research to determine what characteristics of the 
market imply a greater (or lesser) degree of efficiency 
among securities. In this way we can hope to uaapt
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accounting information standards to a specific market 
requirement." [1979, p. 90]
s u m m a r y
Despite the acceptance of the semi-strong form of 
market efficiency, the evidence concerning market efficiency 
is not unanimous. Anomalies which are inconsistent with 
market efficiency are being found at an increasing rate. In 
the midst of all the contradictory evidence on market 
efficiency, the relative efficiency hypothesis is emerging, 
stating that there may exist a differential market 
efficiency for different firms. This hypothesis appears to 
be consistent with observed phenomena. However, the real 
test of the theory is empirical evidence. Options trading 
provides such an opportunity to test the relative efficiency 
hypothesis empirically.
2.3 OPTIONS STUDIES
S ince the incept ion of the CBOE in 197 3, opt ions 
trading has grown significantly. Cox and Rubinstein (CR)
[1985] attribute the growth of options trading to their 
desirable properties. For instance, there is no up-tick 
rule governing short sales of options, as there is with 
stocks. The up-tick rule prohibits the shortselling of 
stock when the price is falling. An investor with adverse 
private information is prohibited from short-selling the
24
stock with declining price (down-tick) but can short its 
equivalent in the options market instead. The second 
desirable aspect is related to the margin requirements. 
Current regulations limit the amount of borrowing that can 
be done using stock as collateral to 50 percent. There is 
no margin requirement for options trading. Thus, investors 
possessing private information can get a much higher rate- 
of-return by trading in the options market than in the stock 
market.
Third, options have lower transaction costs than 
stocks. CR contend that transaction costs can be reduced by 
investing in options to establish a position which is held 
for a short period of time and requires frequent switching 
between stock and bonds. This uniqueness, according to CR 
[1985, p.54] may partially explain why short-term listed 
options are more popular than long-term listed options.3
Options and Market Efficiency
Options trading has created additional trading 
activities within the securities markets. Because of these 
activities, some researchers suggest that options may make 
the market more efficient. Ross [1976] contends that 
options may improve the allocational efficiency of the
3Cox and Rubinstein [1985] also discuss many other 
desirable aspects of options (see p.47-59).
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economy. He shows that options can make an incomplete 
market more complete. Extending Ross's contention, Kluger 
and Wyatt [1988] argue that information efficiency might 
also be improved because information which is signalled to 
the market through a single price before options are listed 
can also be signalled through two separate prices after 
options are listed.
Studies also show that options trading may improve the 
speed of price adjustment to publicly available information. 
For example, Jennings and Starks (JS) [1986] investigate the 
stock price adjustment process initiated by quarterly 
earnings announcements with two samples of firms: one having 
exchange-listed options and another lacking exchange-listed 
options. JS find that the stock prices of non-options firms 
take a longer time to adjust to the earnings announcement 
than the stock prices of options firms. Thus, JS contend 
that the existence of options markets is useful in 
disseminating information (i.e., the market becomes more 
efficient). But the JS study has been criticized by 
Woodruff and Senchack [1988] for not controlling for the 
amount of information content in the earnings announcement.A 
The procedure is necessary because JS [1985] find that the 
speed of stock price adjustment is directly related to the
AThe information-content is measure by the amount of 
unexpected earnings.
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amount of information-content of the earnings announcement. 
Specifically, the adjustment process is faster for firms 
which have less information-content in their earnings 
announcement than for firms which have more information 
content in their earnings announcement. Therefore, JS's
[1986] failure to control for the information-content of the 
two groups may have biased their results.
Options and Information Processing
There is some empirical evidence supporting the 
proposition that options trading enhances information 
processing, and hence the informational efficiency of the 
securities markets. Manaster and Rendleman (MR) [1982] 
suggest that options trading affects the way stock prices 
adjust to the release of information relevant to the firm.
MR test and find support for the hypothesis that options 
prices contain information that is not reflected in stock 
prices for a period of up to 24 hours. This suggests that 
options prices reflect the options market's own assessment 
of stock value instead of the contemporaneously observed 
stock price. Other studies which find that the options 
market leads the stock market include Bhattacharya [1987], 
Snelling [1986], and Anthony [1988].
The above findings have significant implications for 
the role of options trading in market efficiency. The 
reason is that if options prices simply reflect the
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contemporaneously observed stock price, then the amount of 
information being processed is the same with or without 
options trading. On the other hand, if the options markets 
process information independently of stock markets, then the 
amount of information being processed should be equal to or 
greater than the amount of information processed by the 
stock markets alone.
Options and Relative Market Efficiency
Diamond and Verrecchia (DV) [1987] infer that because 
the options markets place fewer restrictions on establishing 
a short position, private information (especially the bad 
news) is impounded into prices much more quickly. As a 
result, DV predict that options listing would influence the 
magnitude of stock prices adjustments to public information 
such as annual earnings announcements. Specifically, DV's 
model suggests that introducing options trading reduces the 
average absolute value of (excess) returns on announcement 
days. In other words, firms with options trading are 
relatively more informationally efficient.
DV suggest that one can measure relative efficiency by 
examining the time series changes of the average absolute 
value of (excess) returns on announcement days before and 
after the options listing. In other works, DV's model
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implies that, ceteris paribus, options listing reduces the 
information content of the earnings announcements of firms.’
The DV model is different from other studies in one 
very distinct aspect. While other studies investigate the 
effeet of options trading on the speed of adjustment to 
publicly available information (e.g., earnings 
announcements), the DV model explores the effect of options 
trading on the speed of adjustment to private information 
(i.e., before earnings are announced). In different terms, 
one may say that DV are interested in the ex ante instead of 
ex post effects of options trading on earnings announcement.
3.4 Summary and Evaluation
The advent of options markets has created a lot of 
excitement in security markets and academic research alike. 
One of the main concerns in research is the role of options 
in market efficiency. Some studies have found that options 
trading enhances the speed of stock price adjustments to 
publicly available information (e.g., earnings 
announcements). Other research has found that options 
trading has facilitated information processing. Diamond and
’Beaver's U statistics is measured as the variance of 
price reaction (proxied by square of excess return) during 
the announcement divided by the variance of the 
nonannouncement period. Therefore, if the absolute value of 
the (excess) return during the announcement is reduced so is 
Beaver's U statistic.
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Verrechia's (DV) [1987] theoretical model suggests that 
options trading enhances the speed of adjustment to 
'private' information.
The DV model is appealing in that it involves the 
concept of relative market efficiency and it can be 
empirically tested. However, the fact that the DV model 
considers only one attribute (short-selling constraints) of 
options listing has restricted the interpretation of the 
role of options in informational efficiency. Other 
attributes of options are potentially helpful in improving 
informational efficiency: higher leverage and lower 
transaction costs. For instance, with higher leverage and 
lower transaction costs, investors may be willing (or able 
to afford) to spend more money on information processing and 
private information acquisition. As a result, firms are 
more efficiently priced and the market is more 
informationally efficient.
Since research generally finds that small firms are 
comparatively less efficiently priced, the effect of options 
listing may be greater for small (OTC) firms than for large 
firms (NYSE or AMEX). Moreover, as mentioned by Atiase
[1987], simply being listed in an exchange may give the 
listed firms greater exposure and create more opportunities 
for private information acquisition. In this respect, 
options listing may benefit OTC firms more than NYSE or AMEX
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firms, since OTC firms were not listed in any other exchange 
before the options listing.
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter presents the methodology to test whether 
options listing has an impact on the information content of 
annual earnings announcements. The chapter is divided into 
six sub-sections: (1) research questions, (2 ) data
collection, (3) measurement of information-content, (4) 
research design, (5) hypotheses, and (6 ) statistical 
analysis.
3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study examines the effects of options listing on 
the informational efficiency of the securities markets.
The information-content of annu" 1 earnings announcements is 
a measure of such effects. The idea is that if options 
listing enhances the informational efficiency of the 
securities market, then firms with listed options will be 
more efficiently priced. Consequently, the information- 
content of earnings announcements for these firms would be 
reduced compared to these without options listing. Tne most 
important research questions of this study are:
Ql: What is the impact of options listing on the 
information-content of the annual earnings 
announcement of exchange firms?
Q2: What is the impact of options listing on the 
information-content of the annual earnings 
announcement of OTC firms?
31
32
Many studies (e.g., Grant [1980], Atiase [1980;1987]) 
have found that the information-content of annual earnings 
announcements is inversely related to the size of firms. 
Based on the discussion in chapter 2, the conjecture is that 
the impact of options listing on the information-content of 
annual earnings announcements would be greater for small 
firms than for large firms. The exchange firms are divided 
into two groups based on their market value (i.e., total 
market shares outstanding multiplied by share price). In 
order to form a match group design, the exchange firms are 
divided in half according to their median price in the year 
before options listing.
Q3: Does options listing have a stronger impact on the
information-content of annual earnings announcements 
of small exchange firms than of large exchange 
firms?
Lastly, Diamond and Verrechia [1987] suggest that 
investors with bad news would prefer to trade in the options 
market rather than in the stock market because of the short- 
selling constraints (up-tick rule) in the stock market. 
Therefore, a priori. the impact of options listing on the 
information-content of earnings announcements should be 
stronger for firms with negative unexpected earnings than 
for firms with positive unexpected earnings. Consequently, 
the study will also investigate whether an options-related 
differential impact exists on the information-content of 
annual earnings announcements of firms with positive and
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with negative unexpected earnings. The fourth questions 
is:
Q4 : Does options listing have a stronger impact on 
exchange firms that have negative unexpected 
earnings than on firms that have positive 
unexpected earnings?
3.2 Data Selection
The data for this study include firms from NYSE, AMEX, 
and OTC that have options newly listed between 1980 and 1986 
in any of the five option exchanges: CBOE, AMEX, NYSE, PHLX, 
and PSE. The stock returns data of the exchange firms are 
obtained from the Center of Research into Securities Prices 
(CRSP) tape; the stock return data of the OTC firms are 
obtained from the National Association of Security Dealers 
Automatic Quotations (NASDAQ) tapes. The EPS forecast data 
are obtained from the Value Line Investment Survey, while 
the actual EPS data are obtained from the WSJ Index. The 
earnings announcement date is the date that appears on the 
WSJ Index. In addition, the Broad tape day which is usually 
one day before the WSJ announcement day is also used to test 
for the options 1isting effect. Prior studies using daily 
data generally reported increased return variability on both 
the WSJ announcement day (day 0) and the Broad tape day (day 
-1) (Patell and Wolfson [1981]). Therefore, the impact of 
options 1ist ing is expected to be strongest on these two 
days.
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Other signi ficant events, such as mergers, stock 
splits, litigation ,etc., that are announced within one 
week of the earnings announcements date will potentially 
confound the events, and, therefore, the data for those 
firms will not be included in the study.
Firms that do not have complete data in any of the 
above sources are excluded from the study. Moreover, if a 
listed firm is delisted from the option exchange within one 
year, it is not included in the study because it is likely 
that the firm's options were not actively traded.
Unexpected Earnings
In the study, the unexpected earnings are obtained by 
comparing the analysts' earnings per share (EPS) forecast 
and the actual EPS before extraordinary items. Several 
studies (Brown and Rozeff [1978;1979]; Collins and Hopwood 
[1980]; Fried and Givoly [1982]; and Imhoff and Pare [1982]) 
have found that financial analysts' predictions of EPS are 
at least as accurate as those produced by statistical 
models. For the purpose of this study, the sign of 
unexpected earnings is positive if the actual EPS is larger 
than the forecast EPS and vice versa.
El5® actual - EPSforera5L
HE = -----------------------
EPS forecast
Daily Stock Return
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This study uses daily stock returns instead of monthly 
or weekly stock returns. Daily returns are used because 
studies have found that daily stock returns are more 
sensitive to informational events than are monthly data 
(Patell and Wolfson [1982], Brown and Warner [1985]). 
However, there are problems uniquely related to using daily 
stock returns: non-normality of daily stock returns and 
nonsynchronous trading.
Non-normality of daily stock return -- Fama [1965] 
suggests that the distribution of daily returns is fat­
tailed rather than normally distributed, and the same holds 
true for daily excess returns (Brown and Warner [1985, 
p.4]). However, based on a simulation study using daily 
data. Brown and Warner (BW) [1985] conclude that the non­
normality of daily returns has no obvious impact on event 
study methodologies. The standard parametric tests for the 
significance of the mean excess return are well-specified.
In fact, BW found that the daily data comparatively has much 
greater power than the monthly data in various tests.
Non-synchronous trading of sample firms —  Non­
synchronous trading occurs when the stock return of a firm 
and the return on the market index are measured over a 
different trading interval. The presence of non-synchronous 
trading would cause the parameters of the Ordinary Lease 
Square (OLS) market model to be biased and inconsistent 
especially with the daily data. For instance, firms with
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shares infrequently traded would cause the beta (0 ) to be 
downwardly biased, while those shares frequently traded 
would cause the f3 to be upwardly biased. The non- 
synchronous trading problem is a particular concern for the 
OTC firms since not all of them are actively traded.
The non-synchronous trading problem should not present 
a major problem in this atudy because one criteria of 
listing an option is that the firm's stock be actively 
traded. Nevertheless, Brown and Warner [1985] indicate that 
"failure to take into account non-synchronous trading in 
estimating market model coefficients does not result in 
misspecification of event study methodologies using the OLS 
market model."
One approach to correct the non-synchronous trading 
problem is to use the Scholes-Wil1iams procedure instead of 
the OLS model. The details of the OLS market model and the 
Scholes-Wil1iams model are given in the following section.
4.3 MEASUREMENT OF INFORMATION-CONTENT
This study uses Beaver's U-statistic to measure the 
information-content of earnings announcements, but daily 
returns instead of monthly returns will be used. However, 
to appreciate the proposed ratio, a brief review of the four 
steps involved in calculating the U-statistic is presented.
Step 1. Obtain the normal (or expected) returns on 
the earnings announcements day by using the
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OLS market model.
The OLS Market Model -- in any event study, a major 
concern is to determine the extent to which the security 
price performance around the event time has been abnormal.
To do that, a model that generates a 'normal' (or expected) 
return is needed. Normal returns are typically determined 
using the OLS market model. One advantage of the OLS market 
model is that it isolates the effect on prices (and returns) 
of firm-specific events from other economy-wide events. In 
this study, the market model developed by Markowitz [1952] 
and Sharpe [1963] will be used:
— Oi + + Mu (1 )
where jilt = an error term,
R1l = return of security i at time t,
R,,,, = return of market portfolio at time t.
Step 2. Determine the variance during the announcement 
period. The variance during the announcement 
period is approximated by the square of 
excess return. The excess return is the difference 
between the actual and the expected return 
(from equation 1).
Mit - R il " [“. + i = AND N (2)
t = 0
<#ilt)2 = <Rit - [a, + R^])2 (3)
where M and N are the observations from the exchange firms 
and OTC firms respectively. And t = 0 is the day of WSJ 
earnings announcement.
Step 3. Calculate the variance during the nonannouncement 
period. The variance of the residual during the
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nonreporting period is estimated from a 100 days 
period ended 2 0 days prior to the earnings 
announcement date:
ii
S2(Mi) =   t = -120,......-20 (4)
T - 2
where T is the number of observations in the nonreporting 
period used to estimate at and in equation 1 .
Step 4. The final step is to compute the U-statistic 
by using the variance (from eq. 3) during the 
announcement period divided by the variance 
during the nonannouncement period (from eq. 4):
U tt = M 2,t/SZ(Mi) (5)
If the earnings announcement has information-content, 
then the sample variance of the residual during the 
reporting period (m2h) should be significantly greater than 
during the nonreporting period (S2(a*t) ) - Therefore, the U1L 
at the time of earnings announcement (t = 0 ) should have a 
value significantly larger than 1 .
Scholes-Wil H ams Procedure
To correct the non-synchronous trading problem, the OTC 
firms use the Scholes-Wil1iams procedure instead of the OLS 
market model to estimate the unexpected returns. The 
Scholes-Williams procedure is as follows:
39
Mtt ~ ®it ~ [at + (®)
where
1 t=-20 1 t=-2 0
at = —  £ Rlt - 0 t   L (7)
100 t=-12 0 100 t=-120
0L = (0, + 0! + */)/(! + 2p) J (8)
where 0t~ and 0t+ are the OLS estimation period values of
cov(R, R».t i) cov(Rt t, R»t+1)
-------------------  and — ----  —  ,
(R-.t i) a(R. t)a(R. tn)
respectively, and p is the estimation period value for the
first-order autocorrelation coefficient of the Equally
Weighted Market Index (see Scholes and Williams [1977, p.
317, eqs. 13-15, 19,20]).
3.4 RESEARCH DESIGH
There are two main groups of sample firms: exchange 
firms and OTC firms. Exchange firms have stocks listed on 
either NYSE or AMEX, while OTC firms are firms that have 
stocks traded over-the-counter. These two groups of firms 
are first analyzed individually for the options effects (see 
Table 3.1 and Table 3.4). The exchange firms are then 
divided into two groups (large and small) based on size 
(measured by the total market value) (see Table 4.2). The 
main reason for such a division is to see wether options 
listing has a differential impact on firms of different
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Table 3.1
Comparison of Average U-»tatistic of Exchange Firms 
Before and After Options Listing
Exchange Firms
Before Option After Option
U (day -20) 
to
U (day +20)
U (day -20) 
to
U (day +2 0 )
Table 3.2
Comparison of Change in Average U-statistic (CU) 
of Large and Small Exchange Firms
Large Firms Small Firms
CU CU
CU (day -20) 
to
CU (day +2 0)
CU (day -20) 
to
CU (day +20)
Table 3.3
Unexpected-Earning* Categories and Suaeary of U-stati*tic
Exchange Fire*
Before Op11on After Option
Unexpected-Earnings 
Category
Degree of 
Surprise 
Criter ion
Announcement Day
-20 < ■> +20
Announcement Day
-20 < > +20
1. Most Favorable
2. Less Favorable
3. Neutral
4. Less Unfavorable
5. host Unfavorable
> + 30Z cr,
+1IX to +30Z 
-5Z to +5X
-30Z to - H Z
1, - M <
< -30Z U s, »
uM
u S,(
u
■> u 3,0*
U
», 2*
U i, » <r U 3,*
U
lf *2* 
ft
U 5, +2#
Tabla 3.4
Comparison of Average u-statistic of OTC Firma 
Bafora and After Options Listing
OTC Finns
Before Option After Option
U (day -2 0) 
to
U (day +20)
U (day -20) 
to
U (day +20)
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size.
Finally, to control for the magnitude of unexpected 
earnings, firms are then classified into five groups 
according to their unexpected-earnings percentage (UE) (see 
Table 3.3). The UE is computed as follows:
UE = [ EPSa(.tlial - EPSforet:ilBt ] /EPS
The daily average U-statistic is computed from twenty 
days before to twenty days after the earnings announcement 
date in order to capture the pre-announcement and post­
announcement effects of options listing as well. If options 
listing has an impact on the information-content of annual 
earnings announcements, the U-statistic during that period 
should be reduced after firms have options listing. 
Therefore, the U-statistic within each group (i.e., exchange 
and OTC firms) is analyzed both before and after options
listing to see if the information-content of the annual
earnings announcement is affected by options listing.
In addition, in order to test for the differential
impact of options listing on the large and small firms, the
change in U-statistic (CU) of the large and small firms 
during the announcement period is compared to test whether 
they are significantly different. The CU of a group is the 
different in average U-statistic between the BO year and the 
AO year on a particular day. Likewise, the CU of the 
negative unexpected earnings group and the positive
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unexpected earnings groups is tested to see if they are 
significantly different.
3.5 HYPOTHESES
The main hypothesis of this study is that options 
listing would reduce the information-content of annual 
earnings announcements. The reason is that if options 
listing enhances the informational efficiency of the 
securities market, then firms should be more efficiently 
priced after than before the options are listed; 
consequently, the earnings announcements of firms in the 
year after options listed should become less informative. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis investigates whether options 
listing reduces the information content of annual earnings 
announcements of exchange firms. All hypotheses are stated 
in their alternative forms.
The average U-statistic during annual earnings 
announcements of exchange firms decreases significantly 
in the year after they have options listed.
In statistical notation form,
H 1 • U  KXH. nn, t > ^EXB.AO.t fc= — I o r  0
The second hypothesis investigates whether the options 
effects is greater for smal1 exchange firms than large 
exchange firms.
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H2: The amount of change (decrease) in the U-statistic 
(CU) during annual earnings announcements of small 
exchange firms is significantly greater than for larga 
exchange firms.
In statistical notation form,
HZ! CUg* t > cu^ t t= -l or 0
The third hypothesis investigates whether the effect of 
options listing is greater on exchange firms that have 
negative unexpected earnings than on exchange firms that 
have positive unexpected earnings.
H 3: The amount of change (decrease) in the U-statistic
(CU) during annual earnings announcement of exchange 
firms that have negative unexpected earnings is 
significantly greater than for firms that have 
positive unexpected earn i ngs.
In statistical notation form,
Hjl DUjup t^ > DUpgg t t= -1 or 0
The last hypothesis is similar to the first three
hypothesis except it is for the OTC firms.
H(,: The average U-statistic during annual earnings
announcements of OTC firms decreases significantly in 
the year after they have options listed.
In statistical notation form,
H** Uon:, no, t > ^orc.Ao.t ^ ®
3.6 Statistical Analysis
This study uses test procedures similar to those used 
by Patell [1976] and McNichols and Manegold [1983]. They
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have derived a parametric Z-statistic to test for the
changes in U-statistic. The Z-statistic is developed in the
following manner. Assuming that the estimation- and
announcement-period means are not significantly different
and that returns are independently distributed, then the t*iL
(unexpected return or residual term) from equation 1 are
distributed such that
E(Mit> = 0 (9a)
var(*ilt) = (1 + l/T) ct,2, (9b)
where (1 + l/T) reflects the increase in variance due to 
prediction outside the estimation period.
c o v (Mi,/Mil) = <*ia/T for s*t, (9C)
where a * is the variance of the estimation period and T is 
the number of days in the estimation period. For any
individual day in the announcement period,
cov (*i1L,/iJt) K 0, i*j , <9d)
where t goes from -20 to +20 days. Since the study is 
conducted in event time, it is reasonable to assume cross- 
sectional independence.
Since is a function of and 0 it it is distributed
independently of stz (the variance during the non-reporting
period). Therefore, the following independent variables may
be developed.
Standardized Prediction Error:
Mtt/fffiU+VT)*] ~ N(o,i) , (ioa)
[ (T-l) 3 *1/ 0 * ~ X 2(t-l) , (10b)
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Under the conditions of Eq.(9a) to (9d), the following 
random variable is distributed as a t-statistic with (T - 1) 
degrees of freedom:
V lt = Mit/ [■it1 + l/T>']~t<T - 1), (11)
with
E(Vlt) = o and var(vlt) = (T -l)(T - 3)
In the following, a Z-statistic is derived to test for 
differences in U-statistic in the before-option year versus 
the after-option year. Squaring the Vlt in Eq.11 produces 
an F-stat istic:
+ l/T)] ~  F(1,T - 1),
where
E ( p i t V [ » i 2<l + l/T)]) =  (T - 1) / (T - 3)
This ratio can be standardized to give the following U- 
statistic:
Dit _ ,E(#lit2(T - 3)/[Si2(l + l/T) (T - 1)])
where
E(Ult) = 1 and var(Uit) - 2*(T - 2)/<T - 5),
By applying the Lindeberg Central Limit Theorem, an 
approximate normal Z-statistic can be constructed:
Uflo.t — *^D,L
Z D.t =  -
[4*(T-2)/N*(T— 5) ]
A similar Z-statistic is derived to test for the
differences in changes in average U-statistic between two
groups such as large and smal1 firms.
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Since EtUpo,.) = 1 and EtU^,,) = 1, 
therefore
E (CD) = B{UM t  - 0*0 t) = 0 and var = 4*(T - 2)/(T - 5)
and
t — CUjjQ t
Z c t=   -----------— --------— --------_ _ --------------------- ------
[4 *(T-2)/nj*(T-5) + 4*(T-2)/n2*(T-5>]*
In addition to the parametric Z-statistic derived 
above, the non-parametric Wilcoxon test is performed to 
ensure that the results are not dominated by outliers (see 
Conover [1980]). The statistical tests on day 0 and day -1 
are a one-tail tests since the theory predicts that the U- 
statistic would decrease during the earnings announcement 
day. On the other hand, the direction of change in the rest 
of the days are unpredictable therefore two-tail tests are 
used.
CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL RESDLTS AND AHALYBI8 OF DATA
A description of the sample and the results of U- 
statistic analysis of both the NYSE/AMEX firms and the OTC 
firms are presented in this chapter.
4.l Sample Selection
There were 377 NYSE/AMEX firms that have options newly 
listed on the five options exchanges between 1981 and 1986. 
However, according to the data selection criteria outlined 
in chapter 3 (page 33), only 170 firms have complete data.
As shown in Table 4.1A, the sample size ranges from a low of 
12 firms in 1984 to a high of 50 firms in 1982. The 
selection procedures produced a large enough sample of 
exchange firms to provide a statistical valid representation 
of the firms in that period of time.
On the other hand, since the OTC firms do not have 
options listed in any options exchange until 1985, the data 
selection are limited to only two years (1985 and 1986). 
There are 69 OTC firms that have options newly listed in 
that period of time. Of the 69 firms, there are only 36 
firms that have data in the WSJ Index and NASDAQ tapes. Of 
the 36 firms, only 23 firms have data on value line as well.
4 9
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Table 4 .ia
Distribution of Sample Firms by 
Ysar in Which Thsy hava Options Mawly Listed
Stock Exchange 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Total
Exchange
(NYSE/AMEX)
44 14 50 18 12 19 13 170
OTC 0 0 0 0 0 21 15 36
Table 4.IB
Distribution of Firms in Options Exchange Listing
OPTIONS EXCHANGE
CBOE AMEX NYSE PHLX PSE
Exchange Firms 
(NYSE/AMEX)
37 4 1 5 45 42
OTC 4 16 3 4 9
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Table 4.1C 
Exchange Firms Average Market Talus 
Before and Aftsr Options Listing 
(in millions)
Average Market Value
Before Option 
(BO)
After Option 
(AO)
Exchange Firms 
(NYSE/AMEX) 1, 152 1,463
OTC 544 595
Table 4.ID 
Exchangs Firms Avsrags Bata 
Bsfors and Aftsr Options Listing
Average Beta
t-test
Before Option 
(BO)
After Option 
(AO)
Exchange Firms 
(NYSE/AMEX) 1.354 1.423 -1. 07
OTC 2 . 527 2 . 561 -0.11
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Esshange Listing
The chosen sample firms are listed in five different 
options exchanges. As shown in Table 4.IB, the numbers of 
exchange firms listed range from five in NYSE to forty-five 
in PHLX. The NYSE did not list options until 1985, which 
explains why there are relatively few firms listed in that 
exchange. Other than NYSE, the sample firms are evenly 
spread across the other four options exchanges. For the OTC 
firms, the options exchange listing ranges from three in the 
NYSE to sixteen in AMEX (see Table 4.IB).
Market Value of Sample Firms
Table 4.1C shows the average market value of firms 
before and after options listing. For the exchange firms, 
the average market value increases from $1,152 million in 
the year before options listing (BO) to $1,463 million in 
the year after options listing (AO) or a 27 percent 
increase. For the OTC firms, however, the average market 
value increases from $544 mill ion in the BO year to $595 
million in the AO year or a 9 percentage increase. As 
expected, the average size of the OTC firms is smaller than 
that of the exchange f irms.
Average Betas of Firms
To obtain the abnormal returns and betas of exchange 
firms, the OLS model is used. The average beta of firms is
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compared before and after options listing in Table 4.ID.
The average beta of exchange firms is 1.354 in the BO year 
and 1.423 in the AO year. The t-test showed that the beta 
change is not significant at any meaningful level.
For the OTC firms, in order to control for the non- 
synchronous trading problem, the Scholes-Wil1iams model is 
used to compute the abnormal returns and beta of firms. The 
average beta of firms is 2.537 in the BO year and 2.561 in 
the AO year. Not surprisingly, the t-test is not 
significant for the OTC firms.
4.2 Empirical Results
The average U-statistic of firms before options listing 
and after options listing is computed in order to test the 
four hypotheses. The average U-statistic from -20 days to 
+20 days around the WSJ earnings announcement day is 
computed by using Equation 5 in chapter 3 (page 38). The 
main reason for covering from -20 days to +20 days is to 
capture the pre-announcement and post-announcement option 
effects. By analyzing the data, it appears that the options 
effects have three phrases or periods. Therefore, to 
enhance the analysis of the results, the whole period is 
divided into three periods: pre-announcement period (day -20 
to day -5), announcement period (day -4 to 0), and post­
announcement period (day +1 to day +20). However, as far as 
the hypotheses testing is concerned, the options effect is
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restricted to day -1 and 0 in the earnings announcement 
period. This issue was discussed previously on page 31.
Day
+ 20
Day Day 
+ 5 +4
Day Day 
0 +1
Day 
+ 20
Pre-announcement
Period
Announcement
Period
Post-announcement
Period
The empirical analysis is carried out in the following 
steps: First, the U-statistic is compared for all 170 
exchange firms to test for the overal1 option 1isting 
effects. Second, firms are divided into two groups (large 
and small) by their market values in order to test for the 
'size' hypothesis. Third, firms are divided into five 
unexpected earnings groups to test for the 'unexpected 
earnings' effect. Finally, all the OTC firms are analyzed 
for the options listing effects in the overall level.
4.2.1 All Exchange Firms
Table 4.2 reports the average U-statistic and the 
statistical tests (Z-statistic and Wilcoxon-test) of all the 
exchange firms before and after options listing. Both 
statistics are used to test the hypothesis that the average 
U-statistic during the announcement period in the year 
before options listing is greater than that in the year 
after options listing.
Tab la 4.2
Comparison of Avaraga U-atatlatic of All 
Exchanga rirms Bafora and Aftar Options Listing
DAY
Average U-statistic
Z-statisticB Wilcoxon-
test(BO) (AO)
-20 0 . 928 0.988 -0.384 0. 407
-19 1. 244 0.924 2.049**A 1.249
-18 0 . 979 0.960 0 . 123 0. 127
-17 1. 064 1.450 -2.477** -1.528
-16 1. 034 1. 056 -0.142 0.011
-15 1. 340 1. 643 -1.947* -1.415
-14 1 028 1. 510 -3.096*** -0.267
-13 1 . 261 1.437 -1.129 -1.080
-12 1. 139 1. 098 0.262 -0.411
-11 1 . 165 1 . 099 0.425 1 . 021
-10 1. 139 0 . 994 0.934 1 . 222
-9 1. 170 1 .214 -0.279 0.794
-8 1 . 226 1 . 066 1.028 -0.012
-7 1 . 112 1.381 -1.728* -0.513
-6 0. 94 7 1.233 -1. 834* 0.378
-5 0.911 0 . 974 -0.406 0.981
-4 1.252 1.206 0 . 294 -0.913
-3 1 . 362 0 . 808 3.557*** 2 . 962***
-2 1. 356 1.246 0 . 708 1.633
-1 2 .231 1.220 6 . 489*** 2 . 095**
0 1.506 1.304 1.293* 2.167**
+ 1 1. 079 1.208 -0.827 -0.813
+ 2 1. 308 1.243 0.417 -1.213
+ 3 1. 227 1 . 097 0.833 0. 133
+ 4 1. 391 0.849 3 . 476*** 2 . 354**
+ 5 1 . 202 1. 015 1 . 198 0 .380
+ 6 1. 277 1 . 112 0 . 995 -0.892
+ 7 1. 067 1. 089 -0.143 -0.182
+ 8 1. 091 1. 907 1 . 186 0 . 946
+ 9 1 .435 1. 130 1.956* 1.806*
+ 10 1 .174 0.968 1. 322 0.743
+ 11 1 . 138 0.981 1 . 002 0.848
+ 12 1.269 1. 357 -0.562 -0.267
+ 13 1 . 160 1. 187 -0.178 -0.260
+ 14 1 . 008 0 . 948 0 . 389 0.594
+ 15 0 . 980 0 . 990 -0.066 0.784
+ 16 0.886 0 . 849 0 .238 -0.523
+ 17 1.480 1. 248 1. 491 - 1.024
+ 18 1. 217 1.207 0 . 064 1. 040
+ 19 1. 234 0 . 985 1. 597 1- 113
+ 20 1. 383 1 . 186 1. 265 1. 381*
A --Signifleant level: *--0.10; **--0,05; ***--0,01. B--A11 tests are
two-tail test except on day -1 and 0 which is one-tail test.
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C O M P A R I S O N  O F  l ' - S T A T I S T I C  H F F O R F  A N D  A F T F R  O P T I O N  LI I N O
AL L  E X C H A N O F .  F I R M ' '
' i" 20
e -■ - e  --  pcf- » f o r  n o w  l i s t i n '-
i i .. t rrrs orr-.nn W I H f
CT\
57
n^ffl,BO,L > E^KB.AO.t t=—1 OT 0
The analysis is performed in two stages. In the first 
stage the analysis is centered upon the announcement period. 
In the second stage, the pre-announcement and post­
announcement effects are examined. During the announcement 
period in the BO year, the average U-statistic on day -1 and 
day 0 is 2.23 1 and 1.506 respectively. In other words, the 
price reaction on the day before the WSJ earnings 
announcement day is 2.231 times higher than during the non­
announcement period.
In the AO year, the average U-statistic has dropped 
down to 1.220 on day -1 and 1.304 on day 0. As shown in 
Figure 4.1, the peak in the AO year is not apparent whereas
the peak in the BO year is apparent. Notably, the U-
statistic in the announcement period is consistently lower 
in the AO year than in the BO year. As shown in Table 4.2, 
the Z-statistic is significant at the 0.01 level for days -1 
and -3. The Wilcoxon test shows significant results on days 
-1, and -3, and also on day 0. The consistency across these
tests indicates that the results are not dominated by
out1iers.
Before drawing any conclusions, it is crucial to extend 
the analysis to the pre-announcement period. For instance, 
by looking at Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2, it is apparent that 
the price activities in the AO year have increased during
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the pre-announcement period. The Z-statistic indicates that 
on days -6 , -7 , -14, -15, and -17 the U-statistic in the AO
year is significantly higher than in the BO year. Only on 
day -19 is the U-statistic in the BO year significantly 
higher than in the AO year. The Wilcoxon test, on the 
other hand, shows that no pair of U-statistic in the pre- 
announcement period is significantly different.
In the post-announcement period, the price activity 
seems to carry on for about ten days in the BO year. Prior 
studies have found that the price does not immediately 
adjust to the earnings announcements as claimed by the 
efficient market hypothesis. In fact, some studies have 
found a post-announcement drift which lasts up to two weeks 
after the earnings announcement. The results in this study 
are consistent with those findings, particularly for the BO 
year. However, there is no evidence of a drift in the AO 
year. It appears that options listing have dampened the 
drift with the exception of the first day or two after the 
announcement. The result is consistent with the notion that 
options firms are more efficiently priced.
Figure 4.1 shows that price activity is generally 
reduced during the post-announcement period. The Z- 
statistic shows significant results on day +4 and +9, 
indicating that the U-statistic in the AO year is 
significantly lower. The results are supported by the 
Wilcoxon test and the t-test.
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In conclusion, both the parametric and nonparametric 
statistics have provided sufficient evidence to support the 
hypothesis that options listing has significantly reduced 
the U-statistic during the annual earnings announcement 
particularly on the Broad tape day (day -1). In other 
words, options listing does reduce the information-content 
of annual earnings announcement. In addition, there is an 
observed increase in price reactions during the pre­
announcement period, indicating that the information related 
to the earnings announcement was impounded into the market 
as many as 17 days earlier. Moreover, the empirical 
findings show that the post-announcement drift disappears 
after the firms have options listed. The results are 
consistent with the notion that options firms are more 
efficiently priced.
4.2.2 Large vs. Small— the 'Size* Hypothesis
The purpose of this section is to test the hypothesis 
that options listing has a stronger impact on the 
information-content of small firms than on large firms.
This test is referred to as the 'size' hypothesis.
H2: CUsh t > CUijg t t= -1 or 0
where CU^ t = Usm.bo.l “ and CU^ t — DljG>BO_t - ^  t
The exchange firms were classified as large and small 
by spliting the 17 0 firms according to their median market 
values in the BO year. The 85 firms with the highest market
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values are labeled large firms; the 85 firms with the lowest 
values are labeled small firms. Since the market value of 
firms usually does not fluctuate, firms remain in the same 
group in the AO year. One advantage of this research design 
is that firms of the large and small group are matched to 
themselves in the BO and AO year.
Average Market value
The average market value of the large firms is $1,911 
million in the BO year and $2,398 million in the AO year 
(see Table 4.3A), while the average market value of the 
small firms is $392 million in the BO year and $510 million 
in the AO year. Since the average market value of the large 
firms is almost five times as much as that of the small 
firms, it should provide a sufficient distinction for these 
two groups of firms to test the 'size' hypothesis.
Average Beta
The average beta of the large firms is 1.120 in the BO 
year and 1.257 in the AO year {see Table 4.3B); the average 
beta of the small firms is 1.603 in the BO year and 1.607 in 
the AO year. The t-tests show that these changes are not 
significant. Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the average beta for large or small firms do not differ
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Table 4.3A
Comparison of tbs Average Msrkst Talus of Largs and Small 
Exchange Firms Bsfors and Aftsr Options Listing
(in millions)
Average Market Value
Before Option 
(BO)
After Option 
(AO)
LARGE 1,911 2,198
SMALL 392 510
Tabls 4.3B
Comparison of the Avsrags Beta of the Large 
and Small Exchange Firms Before and After Options Listing
Average Beta
t-test
Before Option 
(BO)
After Option 
(AO)
LARGE 1 . 120 1.257 -1.34
SMALL 1 . 603 1.607 nO01
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due to options listing.
As expected, the beta for the small firms is much 
higher than the beta for the large firms. One reason for 
the difference is that smaller firms usually are growing 
firms; therefore, they tend to be riskier than large firms.
Statistical Analysis
During the announcement period in the BO year, both the 
large firms and small firms peaked on day -1 (see Figure 
4.2A and 4.2B). However, the peak for the large firms is 
not as high as for the small firms. Prior studies (e.g., 
Grant [1980], and Atiase [1987]) have found that the price 
reactions of the small firms during the earnings 
announcement period is higher than that of large firms. The 
result of this study is consistent with the previous 
findings. In the BO year, the U-statistic for the smaller 
firms on day -1 is 2.603 (see Table 4.4B), while the U- 
statistic for the large firms is only 1.833 (see Table 
4.4A). Before testing the 'size' hypothesis, the large and 
small groups are analyzed individually.
Large Firms
Figure 4.2A shows that the U-statistic of the large 
firms is generally lower in the AO year during the 
announcement period. The Z-statistic shows that the U-
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Table 4.4A 64
comparison of Average u 
Exchange Firms Bsfors and
-statistic of 
After options
Large
Listing
DAY
Average
(BO)
U--statistic
(AO)
Z-statistic'h Wilcoxon- 
test
-20 0. 927 1 . 108 -0.820 -0.757
-19 1. 096 1. 049 0.210 0.328
-18 0 . 634 0.953 -1.447 -1.387
-17 0.992 1. 521 -2 . 398 * *B -1.463
-16 0.820 1.123 -1.375 0. 042
-15 0.844 1 . 800 -4 . 339*** -1.933*
-14 0.944 1 . 181 -1.074 -0.855
-13 1. 352 1.254 0 .448 -0.974
-12 1.024 1. 050 -0.118 -1.027
-11 0. 942 1. 072 -0.590 0. 134
-10 0 . 979 0.839 0 . 637 1 . 181
-9 1. 152 0.996 0. 707 0. 791
-8 1.136 1.154 -0.081 0. 452
-7 1 . 569 1. 619 -0 .226 -0,249
-6 1.012 1. 446 -1.972** -0.394
-5 0 . 860 0.884 -0.113 1. 063
-4 1.311 1 . 023 1. 308 0.516
-3 1. 460 0.873 2 . 667*** 2 . 702***
-2 1 . 212 1. 104 0.489 1.756*
-1 1.833 1.180 2.964*** 0 .712
0 1.647 1. 183 2.106*** 1.419*
+ 1 1. 142 1 . 168 -0.114 -0.060
+ 2 1. 692 1.312 1.724* -0.374
+ 3 1.350 1 . 282 0. 309 0 . 818
+ 4 1. 722 0 . 658 4 . 831*** 2.897***
+ 5 1. 123 0 . 922 0.913 1. 328
+ 6 1. 536 0 . 793 3 . 375*** 0.447
+ 7 1.350 1. 104 1 . 116 1. 172
+ 8 1. 164 0 .756 1.849* 0.060
+ 9 1. 542 1 . 305 1. 073 0.715
+ 10 1.212 0 . 860 1 . 601 1. 073
+ 11 1. 079 0 .937 0. 642 0 . 028
+ 12 1. 214 1 . 160 0.243 0 . 163
+ 13 0.953 0 . 761 0.873 -1.318
+ 14 0.895 0 . 929 -0.155 0. 672
+ 15 0 . 866 0 .851 0. 069 0.740
+ 16 0. 941 0 .957 -0.069 0. 534
+ 17 1. 594 1. 365 1. 038 -1.413
+ 18 1. 242 1. 687 -2.016** 0. 134
+ 19 1. 236 1. 154 0.371 0.983
+ 20 1. 313 1. 164 0. 677 0. 986
A--Significant level: *-'0.10; **--0.05; ***--0.01. B--A11 tests
are two-tail test except on day -1 and 0 which is one-tail test.
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Comparison of Avaraga O-statistio of Small 
Exchanga Firms Bafora and Aftar Options Listing
Average U-statistic
DAY --------------------  Z-statisticA Wilcoxon-
(BO) (AO) test
-20 1.018 0.957 0 . 280 1. 367
-19 1 .377 0.7-9 2.670***B 1. 501
-18 1.313 0.956 1 . 620 1. 535
-17 1. 124 1.363 -1.085 -0.670
-16 1.236 0 . 977 1. 174 -0.007
-15 1 . 820 1.467 1. 603 -0.015
-14 1 . 100 1.822 -3 . 278*** 0 .330
-13 1. 155 1. 604 -2.036** -0.536
-12 1. 240 1. 133 0.486 0 . 391
-11 1.375 1. 113 1. 187 1. 330
-10 1.286 1. 137 0. 676 0. 538
-9 1. 175 1.418 -1.100 0. 319
-8 1.301 0.964 1. 526 0. 472
-7 0 . 642 1 . 127 -2.203** -0.367
-6 0 . 870 1. 004 -0.607 1. 005
-5 0 .951 1. 052 -0.458 0. 355
-4 1 . 178 1.376 -0.896 -1.845*
-3 1. 248 0 .734 2.334** 1.403
-2 1. 484 1.373 0. 506 0.550
-1 2 . 603 1.246 6.159*** 2 .215*
0 1.329 1. 410 -0.368 1. 527*
+ 1 1 . 002 1.233 -1.048 -1.075
+ 2 0 . 909 1 . 160 -1.138 -1.365
+ 3 1 . 089 0.899 0.861 -0.668
+ 4 1 . 043 1. 030 0. 056 0 . 464
+ 5 1 . 266 1. 096 0.770 -0.754
+ 6 1. 003 1.438 -1.975** -1.803*
+ 7 0.771 1 . 062 -1.317 -1.422
+ 8 1 . 006 1. 046 -0.181 1. 290
+ 9 1.310 0 . 941 1.677* 1.762*
+ 10 1 . 122 1. 065 0. 258 -0.012
+ 11 1. 183 1 .014 0. 766 1. 169
+ 12 1. 310 1. 538 -1.034 -0.603
+ 13 1. 352 1 . 600 -1.124 0. 837
+ 14 1 .110 0. 955 0.703 0.071
+ 15 1 . 082 1.118 -0.163 0. 369
+ 16 0 . 820 0.721 0. 450 -1.228
+ 17 1. 349 1.116 1. 058 0 . 018
+ 18 1. 177 0.713 2.107** 1. 351
+ 19 1. 217 0 . 804 1.874* 0. 528
+ 20 1.437 1. 194 1 . 101 1. 024
A--Significant level: *--0.10; **--0.05; ***--0.01. B--A11 tests
are two-tall test except on day -1 and 0 which is one-tail test.
Tabla 4.4C 66
Comparison of Changs in Avaraga U-statistic Batwsan 
Larga and Small Exchanga Firms
DAY
Large
Firms
Small
Firms
CULG.t
Z-statisticA Wilcoxon
test
-20 -0.181 0 . 062 -0.780 -0.370
-19 0. 046 0. 588 -1. 74 3 *B -1.065
-18 -0.319 0. 357 -2.172** -1.706*
-17 -0.528 -0.239 -0.929 -0.874
-16 -0.303 0 .259 -1.806* -1.349
-15 -0.956 0 . 353 -4.209*** -1.765*
-14 -0.237 -0.722 1. 561 -0.070
-13 -0.099 -0.449 1.760* 0. 459
-12 -0.026 0 . 107 -0.428 -0.196
-11 -0.130 0 . 262 -1.258 -2.027**
-10 0*140 0.149 -0.027 -0.073
-9 0 . 156 -0.242 1 . 280 -0.590
-8 -0.018 0 . 3 j6 -1.139 -0.604
-7 -0.050 -0.485 1.400 0 . 885
-6 -0.435 -0,134 -0.967 -0.386
-5 -0.025 -0.101 0 .244 -0.737
-4 0.268 -0.197 1 . 561 1. 069
-3 0 . 588 0.514 0.236 0. 254
-2 0 . 108 0 .112 -0.012 -0.353
-1 0. 653 1. 357 -2.263** -0.623
0 0.464 -0.073 1.725* 1.108
+ 1 -0.025 -0.231 0 . 661 0. 356
+ 2 0 . 380 -0.251 2.028** 0 . 621
+ 3 0 . 068 0. 190 -0.391 -0.356
+ 4 1. 064 0 . 012 3 . 383*** 0 . 517
+ 5 0.201 0. 170 0 . 101 1.679*
+ 6 0.744 -0.435 3.791*** 1.754*
+ 7 0.246 -0.290 1. 724* 2 .317**
+ 8 0. 407 -0.040 1.438 -0.216
+ 9 0.237 0.370 -0 .427 -0.547
+ 10 0. 353 0. 057 0.951 0. 257
+ 11 0. 142 0. 169 -0.088 -0.864
+ 12 0. 054 -0.228 0. 905 1 . 062
+ 13 0. 192 -0.248 1.415 -0.116
+ 14 -0.034 0. 155 -0.608 -0.737
+ 15 0 . 015 -0.036 0. 164 -0.439
+ 16 -0.020 0 . 099 -0.384 0 . 109
+ 17 0 .229 0.233 -0.014 -0.562
+ 18 -0.444 0 .464 -2.291** -0.676
+ 19 0 . 082 0.413 -1.064 -0.682
+ 20 0 . 149 0 . 243 -0.300 0. 408
A--Significant level; *-*0.10; **--0.05; ***--0.01. B--A11 tests
are two-tail test except on day -1 and 0 which is one-tail test.
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statistic in the AO year is significantly lower on day -1 
and -3 of the announcement period. The Wilcoxon test shows 
significant results only on day -3. One plausible 
explanation for the inconsistency between the two tests on 
day -1 is outliers; a few firms with a highly significant 
difference in U-statistic dominate the results.
In the pre-announcement period, the Z-statistic shows 
that the large firms have significant results on day -15 and 
-17. The Wilcoxon test barely coroborates the results for 
day -15 but only significant at 0.25 level on day -17. The 
results indicate that information related to the earnings 
announcement affects the market as many as eighteen days 
before WSJ earnings announcement day in the year after 
options listing.
In the post-announcement period, Figure 4.2A shows that 
there exists a post-announcement drift for the large firms 
in the BO year. The drift disappears in the AO year. The 
Z-statistic shows that the U-statistic in the AO year is 
significantly lower on day +2, +4, +6 , and +8 , but higher on 
day +18. Yet, the Wilcoxon test showed a significant result 
for only day +4.
In conclusion, there is only mild evidence that options 
listings reduces the information-content of annual earnings 
announcement of large firms. The fact that the Wilcoxon 
test does not show consistent results with the Z-statistic
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indicates that the impact of options listing may be very 
strong on certain firms but not on the others.
Small Firms
In the announcement period, the Z-statistic of the 
small firms shows significant results on day -1 and -3. The 
Wilcoxon test is significant only on day -1 (see Table 
4 . 4B) .
The small firms have mixed results in the pre­
announcement period. For example, the Z-statistic shows 
that the U-statistic in the AO year is significant higher on 
day -7, -13, and -14; it is significantly lower on day -19. 
The Wilcoxon test is significant only at 0.25 level on day - 
18 and -19.
In the post-announcement period, Figure 4.2B shows 
that, unlike the large firms, small firms do not show a 
drift. This phenomenon is contradictory to the claim that 
post-earnings announcement drift is the result of market 
inefficiency. Large firms generally are more efficient than 
small firms and as a result, the drift should appear in the 
small firms.
During the post-announcement period, mixed results are 
shown by the two tests. Price reactions increase 
significantly for both tests on day +6 . However, price 
reactions decrease significantly for both tests on day +9 
and for the Z-statistic on days +18 and +19.
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The conclusion drawn from the statistical results is 
that options listing has a strong impact on small firms 
during the earnings announcement period. In other words, 
options listing reduces the information-content of annual 
earnings announcement of small firms. During the pre­
announcement and post-announcement periods, the options 
listing effects do not seem to have a clear pattern.
'Size* Hypothesis
After being analyzed individually, the data were tested 
statistically to see if the impact of options listing is 
stronger on the small firms than on the large firms. In 
this section, the statistical tests of the size' hypothesis 
are presented. Table 4.4C presents the statistical results 
of the hypothesis testing. The figures on the first left- 
hand column represent the change in average U-statistic (CU) 
between the BO year and the AO year of the large firms. For 
example, the number 0.464 on day 0 of Table 4.4C represents 
the difference of 1.647 on day 0 of the BO year and 1.183 on 
the day 0 of the AO year of Table 4.4A . Likewise, the 
second column is for the smal1 firms. The signs of the 
figures indicate the direction of differences. For 
example, a negative sign means that the average U-statistic 
is higher in the AO year and vice versa. If the large and 
small groups have the same sign on a particular day such as
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day -1 , that means options listing has the same impact on 
these two groups on that particular day.
One important note is that since the purpose of the 
'size* hypothesis is to see if the impact of options listing 
is "stronger" on the small group than on the large group; 
therefore, the Z-statistic is meaningful only to those days 
that the two groups of firms have the "same" sign.
Otherwise, the Z-statistic simply means that the two groups 
are different but does not indicate whether the impact is 
stronger on one group than on the other.
As far as hypothesis testing is concerned, the analysis 
is concentrated on those days that the two groups have the 
same sign on CU. During the announcement period, both 
groups show a positive sign on CU from day -1 to day -3, 
indicating that their U-statistic has decreased in the AO 
year. The Z-statistic only shows significant results on day 
-1, whereas the Wilcoxon test shows insignificant results on 
that day. Based on the above results, the statistical 
evidence only mildly supports the 'size' hypothesis. On day 
0 , the two groups have different signs, indicating that 
options listing has opposite impacts on these two groups.
In the pre-announcement period, there are many days 
that the CU of the two groups has opposite signs, indicating 
that options listing may have an opposite effect on them. 
Likewise, in the post-announcement period, the CU of the two 
groups has different signs on nine out of fifteen days. As
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a result, it is difficult to assess the differential options 
listing impact on these two groups in the pre- and post­
announcement periods.
In conclusion, the statistics provide mild evidence to 
support the 'size' hypothesis. In other words, the results 
do show that options listing has a slightly stronger impact 
on small firms than on large firms during the earnings 
announcement period. The comparative analyses of the large 
and small firms provide several interesting insights which 
would help further research. First, it appears that after 
options 1 isting, the information seems to impact the market 
earlier for the large firms than for small firms. For 
example, large firms showed an observed increase in the U- 
statistics from day -18 to -14 in the pre-announcement 
period. A similar phenomenon can be observed for the small 
firms from day -9 to day -5. One plausible explanation is 
the information of large firms is more accessible to the 
analysts than that of small firms. Therefore, investors are 
able to process or acquire the earnings information earlier.
Another observation is related to the post-earnings 
announcement drift. It only appears in the BO year of the 
large firms but not in the AO year. The drift lasts for 
about two weeks, which is consistent with previous findings. 
In the AO year, however, the drift seems to disappear. 
Further research is necessary to find out what really causes 
the drift and why options listing seems to make the drift
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disappear. Unlike the large firms, there is no apparent 
drift observed in the small firms. The results are 
inconsistent with the theory that the drift is the result of 
market inefficiency, because large firms are generally more 
informationally efficient than small firms.
4.2.3 The 'Unexpected Earnings* Hypothesis
This section presents the statistical results to test 
the hypothesis that options listing has a stronger impact on 
firms which have negative unexpected earnings (NEG) than on 
firms which have positive unexpected earnings (POS). The 
design is similar to the previous design that the groups are 
not matched groups:
H3: CU^,. > CU** t t = -1 or 0
Sample Data
Table 4 .5A shows the distributions of firms in the five 
unexpected earnings categories. However, the number of 
firms in group 1 and group 4 of the BO year is too small. 
Likewise, the number of firms in group 1 and group 2 in the 
AO year is also too small. Since such a small number of 
firms would make the statistical testing less meaningful, 
group 1 and group 2 are combined into one negative 
unexpected earnings group (NEG), and group 4 and group 5 are 
combined into one positive unexpected earnings group (POS).
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Table 4.5A 
Distribution of Exchange r i m  
in the Unexpected Earnings Criteria
Unexpected Earnings 
Criteria
Degree of
Surprise
Criterion
Sample Size
BO AO
1. Most Favorable > +30% 8 9
2. Less Favorable +11% - +30% 24 8
3. Neutral -5% - +5% 64 60
4. Less Unfavorable -30% - -11% 14 29
5. Most Unfavorable < -30% 30 40
Table 4.5B 
Distribution of Exchange Firms 
in the Unexpected Earnings Criteria
Unexpected Earnings 
Criteria
Degree of
Surprise
Criterion
Sample Size
BO AO
1. Postitive (POS) > +10% 32 17
2. Neutral (NEU) -5% - +5% 64 60
3. Negative (NEG) < -10% 44 69
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Table 4.6A 
Comparison of tbs Average Market Valua 
of tha Unexpected Earnings Groups 
(in millions)
Unexpected
Earnings
Group
Average Market Value
Before Option 
(BO)
After Option 
(AO)
Positive
(POS) 871 1,408
Neutral
(NEU) 1, 500 2 , 099
Negative
(NEG) 814 1,031
Table 4.6B 
Comparison of tha Avaraga Bata of tha 
Unexpected Earnings Groups
Unexpected
Earnings
Group
Average Beta
Before Option 
(BO)
After Option 
(AO) t-test
Posit ive 
(POS) 1 - 57 1.24 3 .25
Neutral
(NEU) 1. 24 1.43 3 . 06
Negative
(NEG) 1.34 1.46 1.33
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Consequently, instead of the original five-group design, the 
new design has only three groups: negative, neutral (NEU), 
and positive (as shown in Table 4.5B).
The average size of the firms (see Table 4.6A) in the 
neutral group is relatively larger than that of the other 
two groups, while the neutral group's beta (see Table 4.6B) 
is relatively lower. The results are as expected. Large 
firms are relatively more stable in their earnings than 
small firms, which explains why the large firms have lower 
betas and smaller unexpected earnings.
By comparing Figures 4.3A, 4.3B, and 4.3C, one can
observe that the NEU group fluctuates less than the POS and 
NEG groups. In addition, the NEU group does not have much 
price activity around the announcement day except on day 0 
of the BO year. On the contrary, the NEG group and the POS 
group have a lot of activity around the announcement day of 
the BO year. However, the activity in both groups seems to 
have declined in the AO year.
Before statistically testing the unexpected earnings' 
hypothesis, the three groups are individually analyzed. 
Occasionally, the NEG group and the POS group are compared 
to show their differences.
Neutral Unexpected Earnings Group (NEU)
In the announcement period, the NEU group does not have
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much activity except on day -1 of the BO year (see Table 
4.7B). The U-statistic on this day is unexpectedly high 
(2.853). Both the Z-statistic and the Wilcoxon test shows 
significant results for tha same day.
In the pre-announcement period, the Z-statistic shows 
significant changes from day -17 to day -12 with an 
exception for day -13. When the Wilcoxon test is used, only 
day -12 and day -15 are significant. Likewise, in the post­
announcement period, the Z-statistic and Wilcoxon test agree 
only on day 44. All other days have significant result lor 
one test but not the other test. In conclusion, there is 
evidence of options listing impact on the NEU group during 
the earnings announcement period and the pre-announcement 
period. During the post-announcement period, however, the 
evidence of options listing effect is guestionable.
Negative Unexpected Earnings Group (NEG)
Figure 4.3C shows that in the AO year, there is a 
general increase in price activity during the pre­
announcement period; a general decrease in price activity 
during the announcement period; and mixed results in the 
post-announcement period. The observed phenomenon is 
consistent with the Diamond and Verrechia (DV) [1987] model, 
which predicts that options listing would enhance the 
release of private information in the pre-announcement
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Comparison of Avaraga U-statistic of POS Exchanga Firms
Bafora and Aftar Options Listing
DAY
Average U-statistic
Z-statisticD Wilcoxon-
test(BO) (AO)
-20 0. 962 0.915 0. 107 -0.693
-19 1. 363 1. 048 0.723 -0.761
-18 1. 327 0.571 1.733*a -1.670*
-17 1 .3 48 1. 064 0.650 0. 525
-16 1 . 354 0. 684 1. 538 -0.903
-15 1.259 0. 648 1.400 -2 . 984** *
-14 1.415 0 . 802 1.405 -0.977
-13 1.212 1.405 -0.442 -0.304
-12 1 . 509 0.424 2.489** -2 .394**
-11 1 .240 0. 909 0. 759 -0.094
-10 1. 109 0.613 1.138 -0.746
-9 1.453 2 . 024 -1.308 -0.283
-8 0.963 0. 520 1. 015 -1.250
-7 0.999 1. 009 -0.021 0.935
-6 1 . 000 0.725 0.630 -0.840
-5 0 . 705 1 . 045 -0.778 -0.462
— 4 0 . 894 0 . 942 -0.110 -0.578
-3 1 .035 0.686 0 . 800 0 .357
-2 1. 368 0.965 0.922 -0.598
-1 1. 407 0.946 1.055 -1.407
0 2 .063 0.985 2 . 472** -1.565*
+ 1 1 . 016 1. 407 -0.897 1. 534
+ 2 2 . 180 0. 805 3.153*** 0.735
+ 3 1. 474 1. 138 0. 772 0. 452
+ 4 1. 045 1 . 061 -0.037 0 . 052
+ 5 1. 093 0 . 682 0.942 -0.157
+ 6 2 . 107 1. 365 1. 701* -0.651
+ 7 0. 595 0 . 516 0.181 -0.557
+ 8 0 . 553 0.974 - 0 .9fc' -0.231
+ 9 1.424 0.466 2 .1 ,8 ** -0.641
+ 10 1. 548 0. 604 2.165** -1.512
+ 11 0 . 881 0. 304 1. 323 -2.629**
+ 12 0.520 0. 889 -0.847 -0.441
+ 13 1. 015 0. 483 1. 221 -0.210
+ 14 0.535 0 . 556 -0.050 -0.727
+ 15 0. 999 0. 353 1.480 -1.471
+ 16 0 . 344 0.482 -0.316 0.798
+ 17 1 . 032 0.371 1. 516 -0.254
+ 18 1 . 314 1.482 -0 .383 0. 389
+ 19 0. 967 0.832 0 . 308 -0.747
+ 20 0. 996 0.798 0 .454 -0.021
A - -Slgn i fleant leve1 : *--0.10; **- -0.05; ***-*0.01. B- -All tests
are two -tail test except on day -1 and 0 which is o n e -tail tes t .
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Comparison of Average u-statistic of NEU Exchange Firms
Firms Bafora and Aftar Options Listing
Average U-statistic
DAY --------------------  Z-statisticB Wilcoxon-
(BO) (AO) test
-20 0 . 896 1. 146 -0.968 0. 065
-19 1. 143 1 . 062 0. 311 -0.367
-18 0 . 774 0.949 -0.678 -0.192
-17 0.978 1.470 -1.904 *A 0.510
-16 0. 591 1. 149 -2.163** 0.485
-15 0* 797 1. 399 -2.333** 2.470**
-14 0.743 1. 183 -1. 707* 1. 047
-13 1. 297 1 . 186 0.433 1. 073
-12 0.810 1. 309 -1.935* 1.867*
-11 1.234 1. 155 0. 308 0 .117
-10 1.463 1. 191 1. 050 -1.123
-9 1. 064 0.902 0. 629 -0.840
-8 1.258 0.983 1. 065 -0.237
-7 1.228 1.400 -0.667 -1.382
-6 1 . 006 1. 103 -0.374 -0.627
-5 1. 174 0 . 887 1. 115 -1.268
-4 1.035 1 . 188 -0.591 0.287
-3 1.231 1 . 041 0 . 736 -1.677*
-2 1. 300 1 . 377 -0.296 -1.157
-1 2.853 1.367 5.756*** -1.925*
0 1.412 1. 104 1. 191 -1.603
+ 1 1. 294 1.085 0.811 -0.947
+ 2 1.230 1. 275 -0.174 -0.032
+ 3 1 . 192 1. 156 0 . 139 -1.305
+ 4 1 . 630 0. 509 4 . 342*** -3.300**
+ 5 1 .203 0 . 882 1. 245 -0.620
+ 6 0 . 888 0. 978 -0.350 1 . 080
+ 7 1. 447 1. 017 1 .666* 0.382
+ 8 1.353 0.754 2.323** -1.223
+ 9 1. 247 0 . 818 1.661* -0.842
+ 10 0. 994 0. 943 0. 196 -0.170
+ 11 1. 089 1 . 020 0 . 268 -0.170
+ 12 1 . 222 0 . 896 1. 265 -0.760
+ 13 0. 858 1.200 -1.324 0.427
+ 14 1. 179 0.713 1 . 806 - 2 .328**
+ 15 0. 704 0 . 734 -0.114 -1.315
+ 16 1. 003 0. 925 0 . 299 0 . 782
+ 17 1. 347 1.437 -0.348 1. 562
+ 18 1.212 1. 409 -0 . 761 -0.722
+ 19 1.213 1 . 101 0.435 -0.652
+ 20 1. 396 1. 385 0.045 -1. 125
A--Significant level: *--0.10; **--0.05; ***--0.01. B-All tests
are two-tail test except on day -1 and 0 which is one-tail test.
Table 4.7C
Comparison of Average U-statistic of NEG
Exchange T i m s  Before and After options Listing
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Average U-statistic
DAY --------------------  Z-statisticB Wilcoxon-
(BO) (AO) test
-20 1. 153 0.940 0, 782 0.556
-19 1. 395 0. 905 1 . 800*A 1. 543
-18 1. 051 1 . 160 -0.400 -0.913
-17 1 . 075 1.719 -2 . 370** -1.201
-16 1. 205 1. 148 0. 209 0.438
-15 2 . 168 2 . 264 -0.350 0 . 162
-14 1. 174 1.911 -2.713** 0. 412
-13 0 . 990 1. 479 -1.798* -0.580
-12 0.928 1 . 166 -0.872 -0.011
-11 0.936 1 . 282 -1.273 0 . 886
-10 0. 545 1. 164 -2 .275** -0.492
-9 1. 150 1 . 357 -0.760 0. 035
-8 1.758 1.242 1.898* -0 .Ill
-7 1. 270 1 . 662 -1.444 -0.388
-6 0.779 1.373 -2.185** -1.199
-5 0 .736 1.272 -1.972** -1.080
-4 1. 192 1 . 175 0 . 060 -0.630
-3 1. 193 0 .736 1.678* 1.846*
-2 1. 548 1. 194 1.303 0. 256
-1 2.236 1. 140 4.031*** 0 . 910
0 1.339 1.547 -0.765 0.403
+ 1 0. 799 1. 394 -2.188** -1 . 926*
+ 2 1. 030 1.233 -0.747 -1 .976**
+ 3 0.778 0 . 890 -0.412 -0.919
+ 4 0.743 1. 074 -1.219 0 .250
+ 5 1. 383 1. 135 0 .910 -0.041
+ 6 0. 987 1.338 -1.291 -1.599
+ 7 0. 758 1. 287 -1.943* -0.503
+ 8 0. 705 1. 050 -1.267 -0.830
+ 9 1. 292 1. 598 -1.123 1 .2/2
+ 10 0.770 1. 048 -1.020 -0.103
+ 11 0.976 0. 940 0. 133 -0.721
+ 12 1. 586 2 . 077 -1.806 -1.749*
+ 13 2 . 022 1.409 2 .255** 0 . 862
+ 14 1.305 0.935 1. 358 -1.428
+ 15 1 . 168 1.435 -0.981 -1.584
+ 16 1 . 099 1.047 0. 191 -0.150
+ 17 2 . 126 1.445 2.507** 0.073
+ 18 1.219 0 . 948 0. 996 2.032**
+ 19 1.603 0.806 2.933*** 0 . 948
+ 20 1. 687 1 . 157 1.949* 0.073
A--Signifleant level: *--0.10; **--0.0^ ; ****-0.01. B--A11 tests
are two-tall test except on day -1 and 0 which Is one-tall test.
Tabl* 4.7D
Comparison of Changs in Avarags u-statistic bstwssn
NEG and POS Group
NEG POS
DAY Group Group Z-statisticB
t CUpos,t
-2 0 0. 213 0.047 0.328
-19 0. 489 0.315 0. 345
-18 -0.109 0. 756 -1.173
-17 -0.644 0. 284 -1.838*®
-16 0 . 057 0.671 -1.216
-15 -0.095 0.611 -1.399
-14 -0.738 0.613 -2.675***
-13 -0.489 -0.193 -0.586
-12 -0.237 1 . 085 -2.621***
-11 -0.346 0.331 -1.342
-10 -0.619 0.496 -2.209**
-9 -0.207 -0.571 0.720
-8 0 . 516 0.443 0.144
-7 -0.393 -0.009 -0.759
-6 -0.594 0.275 -1 .721*
-5 -0.536 -0.339 -0.390
-4 0 . 016 -0.048 0. 127
-3 0.456 0 .349 0.212
-2 0 . 354 0 . 402 -0.095
-1 1.096 0.460 1.2 60
0 -0.208 1.078 -2 . 548**
+ 1 -0.595 -0.391 -0.403
+ 2 -0.203 1.375 -3 . 127***
+ 3 -0.112 0.337 -0.889
+ 4 -0.331 -0.016 -0.624
+ 5 0 . 248 0.411 -0.323
+ 6 -0.351 0 . 742 -2.166**
+ 7 -0.529 0. 079 -1.204
+ 8 -0.345 -0.420 0 . 149
+ 9 -0.305 0. 958 -2.504**
+ 10 -0.278 0 . 944 -2.420**
+ 11 0.036 0 . 577 -1.072
+ 12 -0.491 -0.370 -0.240
+ 13 0.613 0 . 532 0 . 159
+ 14 0. 369 -0.022 0 . 775
+ 15 -0.267 0. 646 -1,808*
+ 16 0 . 052 -0 .138 0. 376
+ 17 0 . 682 0 . 661 0. 040
+ 18 0.271 -0.167 0 . 868
+ 19 0. 797 0.134 1. 314
+ 20 0.530 0. 198 0 . 657
A--Significant level; *-*0.10; **--0.05; ***--0,01. B--A11 tests
are two-tail test except on day -1 and 0 which is one-tail test.
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period, especially if the information were bad news. The DV 
model also predicts the reduction of price activity during 
the announcement period. During the announcement period, 
the Z-statistic (see Table 4.7C) shows significant results 
on day -1 and day -3. The Wilcoxon test shows significant 
results on day -3 but insignificant results on day -1.
In the pre-announcement period, the Z-statistic shows 
significant increases in U-statistics on eight days. The 
Wilcoxon test does not support any of those results. 
Likewise, in the post-announcement period, the Z-statistic 
also shows significant increase in U-statistics on several 
days but none of those days' increases are supported by the 
Wilcoxon test. In conclusion, the statistical evidence only 
moderately support options listing impact on the NEG group.
Positive Unexpected Earnings Group fPOSl
Figure 4.3A of the POS group shows that, unlike the NEG 
group, there is a general decrease in U-statistic during all 
three periods of the AO year. During the announcement 
period, the Z-statistic shows significant decrease in U- 
statistic on day 0 (see Table 4.7A). The Wilcoxon test 
shows significant results only on day 0 .
In the pre-announcement period, both the Z-statistic 
and the wilcoxon test show significant results only on days 
-12 and -18. In the post-announcement period, the Z- 
statistic shows significant results on day +2, +6 , +9, and
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+10. But the Wilcoxon test shows significant results on day 
+11 only.
In conclusion, the statistical tests showed shows 
moderate options listing impact on the' POS group. The 
following section statistically tests the 'unexpected 
earnings' hypothesis to see if the impact of options listing 
is statistically stronger on the NEG group than on the POS 
group.
The 1 Unexpected Earnings1 Hypothesis
Table 4.7D presents the statistical results from the 
test on the 'unexpected earnings' hypothesis. Similar to 
Table 4.4C of the 'size' hypothesis, the figure on the left 
hand column represents the change in the U-statistic (CU) in 
that group. The sign of the CU represents the direction of 
the change in U-statistic. During the announcement period, 
these two groups of firms have the same sign from day -3 to 
—1. This indicates that the U-statistic for both groups of 
firms has decreased during these three days in the AO year. 
Despite the data showing that the decrease in the U- 
statistic for the NEG group is much greater than that of the 
POS group on day -1, the Z-statistic does not show highly 
significant changes on any of the three days. Since this is 
not a match group design, there is no appropriate 
nonparametric test parallel to the Z-statistic. On day 0,
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the two groups have opposite signs on CU, indicating that 
options listing have an opposite impact on these two groups.
During the pre- and post-announcement period, these two 
groups have opposite signs on most of the days. In that 
case, the significant results of the Z-statistic merely 
means that the options listing impact on these two groups 
are different, but it carries no implication as to whether 
the impact is stronger on one group or another.
In conclusion, despite the data showing that the impact 
of options listing has a stronger impact on the NEG group 
than on the POS group during the earnings announcement 
period, the statistical results do not strongly support the 
'unexpected earnings' hypothesis. In addition, options 
listing seems to have an opposite impact on these two groups 
during the pre-announcement and the post-announcement period 
making it difficult to test for the differential options 
1isting effects on these two groups.
One plausible explanation for the insignificant results 
is that the sample size of the unexpected earnings groups 
are too small. For example, the sample size of the positive 
group is thirty-two in the BO year and seventeen in the AO 
year. The small sample makes it more difficult to reject 
the null hypothesis. Of course, the other plausible 
explanation is that the 'unexpected earnings' effect is not 
as strong as Diamond and Verrechia [1987] suggested.
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4.2.4 OTC Firms
Since there are only twenty-three OTC firms which have 
forecast data in the value line, it is not feasible to 
divide the firms into unexpected earnings groups to test for 
the 'unexpected earnings' hypothesis as with the exchange 
firms. Instead, statistical analysis of the OTC firms can 
only be performed on the aggregate level. Thirty-six firms 
have sufficient data to perform the aggregate level analysis 
(Note: analysis at the aggregate level does not require the 
forecast data in value line).
Table 4.8 provides the statistical analysis to test the 
hypothesis that options listing significantly reduces the U- 
statistics of the OTC firms.
i  U o T C .B O .t ,  *  ^ O T C .A O .t  ^  =  — 1  ° r  ®
Figure 4.4 shows that the distribution of U-statistic 
of the OTC firms is not as smooth as that of the exchange 
firms (see Figure 4.1). There are two plausible 
explanations: 1) the sample size of the OTC firms (36) is
much smaller than the sample size of the exchange firms 
(170); and 2) the OTC firms are riskier than the exchange 
firms. Despite the differences in fluctuation, the 
distribution pattern of the U-statistic between these two 
groups is very similar. They both show that there is a 
general increase in U-statistic in the pre-announcement 
period, and a general decrease in U-statistic during the
Tab la 4.8
Comparison of Avarags U-statistio of All
OTC Firms Bsfora and Aftsr options Listing
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Average U-statistic
DAY --------------------  Z-statisticB Wilcoxon-
(BO) (AO) test
-20 1. 545 1. 235 0. 920 0.282
-19 2 . 170 1.305 2.560**A 1. 059
-18 2 . 001 1. 152 2.510** 0 . 957
-17 0 . 916 0. 667 0. 740 0 . 630
-16 1.314 0.928 1. 140 1. 487
-15 1. 780 0 . 680 3.250*** 0.879
-14 1. 509 0. 949 1.650* 1. 064
-13 0.946 0. 962 -0.050 1. 036
-12 1. 064 1.750 -2.030** -0.292
-11 1. 209 1.026 0. 540 0. 563
-10 1 . 108 1.021 0 . 260 1. 565
-9 1.317 1. 385 -0.200 1. 278
-8 0.970 0.926 0. 130 -1.358
-7 1. 015 1. 759 -2 .200** -0.946
-6 1.273 1. 965 -2.040** -0.946
-5 1. 804 1. 178 1.850* 1. 245
-4 1. 197 1 .293 -0.290 0 . 794
-3 2.470 1. 094 4.060*** 1. 053
-2 2 . 014 1. 291 2.140** 1. 143
-1 2.364 1.703 1.950* 1.487*
0 1.062 2 . 395 -3.940*** -2.326**
+ 1 1.521 0 . 824 2.060** 0 . 692
+ 2 1.413 1 . 157 0. 760 1. 064
+ 3 0 .812 0.492 0.950 1. 105
+ 4 0.535 1.240 -2.080** -1.510
+ 5 1. 153 0. 683 1. 390 0.276
+ 6 1 . 108 0. 655 1.340 0.997
+ 7 0. 902 0. 954 -0.150 0 . 585
+ 8 1 . 126 2 . 264 -3 . 360*** -0.766
+ 9 1. 371 1. 123 0 . 730 0 . 129
+ 10 0.840 0.753 0 . 260 0 . 033
+ 11 0.714 1 . 161 -1.320 -0.366
+ 12 1 . 329 1 .008 0.950 -0.203
+ 13 0 . 770 1 . 028 -0.760 -0.856
+ 14 0.801 1. 405 -1.790 -0.963
+ 15 0.887 1.734 -2.500** -1.419
+ 16 1 . 228 1.480 -0.740 -1 . 442
+ 17 1 . 680 1.077 1.780* 0 .839
+ 18 1. 389 1.211 0. 520 -0.681
+ 19 0.644 2 .075 -4.230*** -1.656*
+ 20 1 . 134 0. 675 1. 360 0.974
A--Signifleant level: *--0.10; **--0.05; ***--0.01. B--A11 tests
are two-tall test except on day -1 and 0 which is one-tail test.
Figure 4.4
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announcement period. During the announcement period, the Z- 
statistic shows that the U-statistic has decreased
significantly on day -1, -2, and -3. The Wilcoxon test only
shows significant results on day -1 .
Both the Z-statistic and the Wilcoxon test show a 
significant increase in the u-statistic on day o which 
appears to be contradictory to the options listing 
hypothesis. However, Figure 4.4 shows that the increase in 
U-statistic on day 0 is followed by a sharp decrease in 
reaction on the following three days. In fact, the Z- 
statistic shows significant decrease in U-statistic on day 
+1. Therefore, a plausible explanation is that, after 
options listing, the security markets speed up the 
adjustments to earnings announcements. Consequently, the 
price reaction incurs in one to two days instead of four to 
five days--which explains why the U-statistic actually 
increases instead of decreases on day 0. If this is the 
case, then the OTC firms are more efficiently priced, and
the result is consistent with the options listing
hypothesi s .
A brief look at the Z-statistic in the pre-announcement 
period shows that the U-statistic increases on day -6 and 
day -7, but the results are not supported by the Wilcoxon 
test. Other than that, there seems to be mixed reaction 
during the pre-announcement and post-announcement periods.
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And on most days, the results are not supported by the 
Wilcoxon test. In other
words, the statistical results do not show any clear pattern 
of impact in either the pre-announcement or post­
announcement periods.
In conclusion, the statistical results on day -1 
support the hypothesis that options listing reduces the 
information-content of the annual earnings announcements of 
the OTC firms. However, there is one major concern in 
testing the options listing effect on the OTC firms is small 
sample size. When sample size is too smal1, the results are 
more easily dominated by outliers and consequently more 
difficult to interpret. In addition, the small sample size 
also affects the validity of statistical testing. For 
instance, the Z-statistic is based on the central limit 
theorem, which can only apply when the size of the sample is 
fairly large. Therefore, in order to obtain more conclusive 
results of options listing effects on the OTC firms, further 
studies are needed when more data are available.
CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This chapter reviews the empirical results of the 
statistical testing. The limitations of the study are 
considered. Lastly, several suggestions are offered for 
future research.
5.1 Review and Interpretation of Empirical Results
The following sections summarize and review the
hypotheses testing results in chapter 4.
Statistical Results of All Exchange Firms Hypothesis
The first set of empirical results is based on the
hypothesis that options listing would reduce the
information- content of annual earnings announcements of the 
exchange firms. A total of 170 firms that have options 
which were newly listed between 1980 and 1986 is included in 
the sample. These firms are quite evenly spread across the 
five options exchanges except the NYSE, which did not list 
options until 1985.
Both the parametric Z-statistic and the nonparametric 
Wilcoxon test show that after options listing, the U- 
statistics of the exchange firms decrease significantly 
during the annual earnings announcement. The options 
listing effect is strongest on the day before the WSJ 
earnings announcement day (commonly known as the Broad tape
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day). The results are not surprising since both prior 
studies found that the Broad tape day, not the WSJ earnings 
announcement day, has the most price activity.
In addition, there is a significant increase in U- 
statistic on several days during the pre-announcement 
period. The results suggest that after options listing, the 
information related to the earnings announcements impound 
into the market as many as 17 days earlier. The results are 
consistent with theories which suggest that markets are more 
informationally efficient for options firms (Manaster and 
Rendleman [1982] and Diamond and Verrechia [1987]).
Moreover, in the before options listing year, there 
exists a post-earnings announcement drift that lasts for 
about ten days. The drift suggests that markets continue to 
adjust to the earnings information for a period of time 
instead of reflecting the information immediately. However, 
the post-earnings announcement drift disappears in the year 
after options listing. It is not clear what causes the 
drift; it is equally unclear why the drift vanishes after 
options listing.
The Statistical Results of the 1Bize1 Effect Hypothesis
The second hypothesis is concerned with whether options 
listing has a stronger impact on the information-content of 
small firms than large firms. It is generally believed that 
small firms are less informationally efficient than large
93
firms, because they have fewer analysts to track their 
activities. In this study, the average market value of the 
large group is about five times greater than the small 
group. The average beta of the large firms is about 1.20, 
while the average beta of the small firms is about 1.60.
Large Firms -- the individual analysis of the large 
firms shows moderate options listing effects on the earnings 
announcement period. In the pre-announcement period, the 
results indicate that, after options listing, the 
information related to the earnings announcement affected 
the market as many as 17 days before opt ions 1isting occurs.
During the post-announcement period of the BO year, the 
drift is very apparent in the large firms but not in the 
small firms. This phenomenon is contradictory to the claim 
that drift is the result of market inefficiency, because 
large firms generally are more efficient than small firms. 
Again, the drift seems to disappear in the AO year. The 
statistical tests show moderately significant results on 
several days.
Small Firms —  compared to the large firms, the 
statistical results of the small firms on the earnings 
announcement day are stronger. The statistical tests show 
highly significant results on the day before the earnings 
announcement. However, the small firms do not show a clear 
pattern of price behavior in either the pre-announcement or 
post-announcement period.
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'Size* Hypothesis -- the statistical tests on the 
'size' hypothesis show that options listing does have a 
moderately stronger impact on small firms than on large 
firms during the earnings announcement period particularly 
on the day before the earnings announcement. During the 
pre- and post-announcement periods, however, the direction 
of the changes in U-statistic between the two groups is 
different most of the time, which makes it impossible to 
assess the di f ferent ial opt ions 1ist ing impact on these two 
groups of firms.
Statistical Results of Unexpected Earnings1 Hypothesis
The third section of the statistical analysis examines 
the hypothesis that options listing has a stronger impact on 
the information-content of firms that have negative 
unexpected earnings than firms that have positive unexpected 
earnings. The exchange firms are divided into three 
unexpected earnings groups: negative, neutral, and positive. 
The results show that the U-statistic in the neutral group 
fluctuates less than in either the negative group or the 
positive group. The findings are consistent with the 
results of prior studies which correlate unexpected earnings 
with unexpected returns.
Neutral Group —  the neutral group has an unexpectedly 
high U-statistic (2.856) on day -1 of the BO year. The 
statistical tests show a significant options listing effect
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on day -1. Significant results are found during the pre- 
announcement but not during the post-announcement periods.
Negative Group -- the statistical tests show mildly 
significant result on day -1 during the announcement period. 
In the pre-announcement period, the statistical results find 
that the U-statistic has significantly increased on several 
days. Likewise, the statistical results also find 
significant increase in U-statistic in the post-announcement 
period.
Positive Group -- the positive group has a moderately 
significant decrease in U-statistic on day n of the AO year. 
During the pre-announcement and post announcement periods, 
however, there is no strong indication of any options 
1ist ing effects.
'Unexpected Earnings' Hypothesis -- after the negative 
and the positive groups were individually analyzed, the two 
groups were tested to see if the decrease in U-statistic 
during the announcement days was greater in the negative 
group than in the positive group. Despite the data showing 
that the decrease in U-statistic for the negative group was 
greater than for the positive group on day -1 , the 
statistical result was not highly significant. In other 
words, the finding is consistent but does not statistically 
support the hypothesis.
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All OTC Firms
Finally, a group of OTC firms are tested for the 
options 1isting effects. The fact that OTC firms only have 
options listed since 1985 make the sample much smaller than 
the exchange firms. The average market value of the OTC 
firms is about 50 percent of the exchange firms. The 
average beta, on the other hand, is much greater for the 
small firms than when compared to the exchange firms.
The small sample size makes it infeasible to test for 
the unexpected earnings effects. Instead, the OTC firms are 
studied only at the overall level. The U-statistics of the 
OTC firms fluctuate more drastically than the exchange 
firms. However, the distribution pattern of the U- 
statistics is quite similar to the exchange firms. There is 
an observed increase in U-statistics in the pre-announcement 
period and a decrease in U-statistics in the announcement 
period.
During the announcement period, the statistical results 
moderately support the options listing effect on day -1. On 
the other hand, there is an increase in U-statistics on day 
0 in the AO year which is inconsistent with the predicted 
options 1isting effects. The increase in U-statistics on 
day 0, however, is followed by a sharp decrease in U- 
statistic over the following three days. The increase in U- 
statistic on day 0 may be caused by a faster adjustment 
process.
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In the pre-announcement period, there is moderately 
significant increase in U-statistic on day -6 and -7. In 
addition, mixed results in both the pre-announcement and 
post-announcement periods are most likely caused by the 
small sample size.
Despite some problems caused by the small OTC sample, 
the statistical results appear to moderately support the 
options listing effect. In order to obtain more conclusive 
results, further studies are needed when more data are 
available.
CONCLUSIONS
Overall, there are strong evidences support the notion 
that options listing reduce the information-content of 
annual earnings announcement of both the exchange firms and 
the OTC firms. In addition, the results also show that the 
impact of options listing is stronger on the small firms 
than the large firms. Options listing has reduced the gap 
between the large firms and small firms as far as the price 
reaction during the earnings annoucement is concerned.
On the other hand, the results do not support the 
’unexpected earnings’ hypothesis. The results do not show 
that the options listing impact is stronger on the small 
firms than large firms. As mentioned in chapter 4, one 
plausible explanation is that the sample size of the 
unexpected earnings group in this study is too small.
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All in all, the results are in line with the thoeries 
of options listing. Across four different designs, the 
results show that the price reactions during annual earnings 
announcement have reduced once firms have options listed.
5.2 Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, one major 
assumption of this study is that options listing is 
equivalent to options trading. In other words, this study 
assumes that once a firm has listed its options, investors 
would start to trade them, which in turn would cause more 
information to be processed and to be impounded into the 
market at an earlier date than without options listing. As 
a result, the information-content of annual earnings 
announcements would be reduced after options listing. The 
assumption would not present a major problem if the sample 
size were fairly large, because most options-1isted firms 
are quite heavily traded.
Second, the sample of the OTC firms is small and this 
makes it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis, 
especially for nonparametric tists. Moreover, a small 
sample makes the data less stable and more easily dominated 
by outliers.
Finally, about half of the exchange firms and OTC firms 
did not have complete data. Consequently, the results are 
biased toward firms that have complete data. Firms with
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complete data are usually large, well-known, and actively 
traded; as a result, the options listing effects may be less 
strong on these firms.
5.3 Suggestions for Future Research
Many studies look into the stock trading volume of 
stocks as a parallel to the stock returns studies. One 
extension of this study would be to use the stock volume 
instead of stock returns to see if similar results can be 
observed with trading volume. The findings in the stock 
volume research might produce a more extensive understanding 
of the opt ions list ing e f fect.
Second, future research may also use the options price 
and volume information available in the Berkeley tape. A 
study may match the price and trading volume activities of 
the options to see if they conform with stock price and 
volume activities. If the two are matched, then it is 
likely that the increase in price reaction of stocks in the 
pre-earnings announcement period is caused by the options 
trading.
Finally, because the sample size of the OTC firms in 
this study was small, it limited the analysis of the options 
listing effects. Further research should be done when more 
data are available in the future, in order to obtain more 
conclusive results.
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